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We propose a novel network interdiction model that reconciles many operational 
realities identified by military literature. Specifically, we conduct network interdiction 
within a dynamic network under partial information, using incomplete feedback and 
allowing two-sided adaptive play. Combining these aspects in an evolving game, we use 
optimization, simulation, and stochastic models to achieve a hybrid model. Modeling 
some currently underrepresented martial problems in this way makes it possible to 
highlight otherwise obscure relationships between policy and outcome, and to discover 
emergent effects, such as deterrence. As an example of this class of problems, we 
consider the struggle between a smuggler and interdictor. The smuggler seeks to 
maximize the amount of forces and materiel infiltrated from an origin to destination. The 
interdictor seeks to minimize this smuggler flow. Using two simple examples of an illicit-
trafficking network, we demonstrate how to use these quantitative models within such an 
interdictor-smuggler context to (1) evaluate the value of seizures as a proxy for smuggled 
materiel, (2) assess the value of exploration, and (3) provide decision makers with 
practical ways to better allocate resources and increase effectiveness. 
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With the rise of war by proxy and growing transnational terrorism and organized 
crime; smuggling and infiltration, and efforts to disrupt these activities through 
interdiction have become central to many nations’ security. Failure by a government to 
guard against both infiltration and smuggling leads to direct threats to these governments’ 
sovereignty. To help tactical decision makers better address these threats, we consider a 
resource allocation problem faced by the interdictor, specifically, where to position 
limited combat power along suspected infiltration routes within the operating area over 
time.  
The interdictor must make these decisions using incomplete information on the 
location of in-transit smuggler goods and the cost and capacity of the smuggler routes. 
Further compounding the problem, we assume the smuggler is both intelligent and 
adaptive. The interdictor’s objective is to best-disrupt the smuggler’s lines of 
communication by minimizing the amount of forces and materiel travelling from the 
smuggler’s safe haven to a destination. Opposing this aim, the smuggler’s goal is to 
maximize the flow of forces and materiel to the destination. 
Previous research into martial contests, such as this interdictor-smuggler context, 
has made various strong assumptions in the name of tractability. These persistent 
assumptions include perfect information, an unchanging environment, and non-
adaptability. We believe these assumptions do not adequately represent problems within 
this interdictor-smuggler context and many other tactical scenarios. 
Our approach  is bottom up. We merge strong aspects of traditional game theory, 
optimization, stochastics, and simulation. First, we design a game with simple rules to 
examine patterns of interest and search for recognizable emergent behaviors. This game 
is instantiated in a terminating discrete event simulation. By repeating this simulation in a 
variety of configurations, each continued over a finite number of time steps, we study the 
time dynamics of our problem in a spectrum of situations. Through this evolution of play, 
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we examine the robustness of interdictor resource allocation policies and smuggling 
tactics. Lastly, we search for emergent relationships during play. 
Our computational study begins with traditional relaxations that include perfect 
information for the interdictor and smuggler. We then demonstrate the effect of private 
information for each player. Private information requires the interdictor and smuggler to 
make estimations of their antagonist’s current state and designs. These estimations 
combined with resource allocation decisions introduce adaptive play under uncertainty. 
We show that adaptive play under uncertainty causes a massive perturbation to both 
game play and outcome.  
Next, we simulate games configured with several specific interdictor and 
smuggler policies using design of experiments. We consider a spectrum of interdictor 
policies that vary both the total resource budget and blend of resource types. The type of 
interdictor resource varies across a spectrum describing its visibility to the smuggler. The 
spectrum ranges from overt (highly visible) to covert (less visible). We also vary the 
scheme by which the smuggler allocates forces and materiel for infiltration across 
shipments. During analysis, we examine each game’s time dynamics and end-results 
through the lens described above. 
We demonstrate our model using two interdictor-smuggler problem instances, 
exposing a number of practical insights useful to decision makers selecting resource 
allocation policies within a counterinsurgency or counter-illicit trafficking setting. The 
first problem instance portrays a smuggling network with a large number of possible 
parallel routes, the second a network with fewer alternative paths but significant depth. 
We find that when allotted a small number of interdiction resources relative to 
the number of available smuggling routes, the interdictor should employ these resources 
in a manner highly visible to the smuggler. Overt deployment will disrupt smuggled 
forces and materiel primarily through deterrence. Using our model, we are able to assess 
the value of deterrence, given other policy options. 
As the interdictor’s resource budget increases, deploying forces less visible to the 
smuggler alongside those highly visible to the smuggler becomes more effective. These 
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highly visible forces should then be used to herd smugglers into waiting ambushes of less 
visible interdiction forces. In contrast to overt policies, pure covert policies primarily 
achieve their effect by actually seizing the smuggled flow. Deterrence is far less 
important under pure covert schemes. For these policies, information is key. Pure covert 
policies encourage the interdictor to target arcs deeper within the smuggling network 
more precisely. 
Intuitively, one might expect that the more the interdictor discovers the network, 
the more he disrupts smuggling, but we find that this is not the case. Even so, if discovery 
of the physical structure of the network is important, interdictor policies with heavy 
allocations to less-visible forces are best suited to the task.  
Finally, we show that the amount of seized materiel is a poor proxy for the total 
amount of smuggled flow. The relationship between these factors is very inconsistent. In 
policies where deterrence is high, the amount of seized materiel provides almost no 
information on the actual amount of unseen materiel successfully smuggled. 
Beyond the direct findings listed above, we reach two deeper conclusions that 
have implications for research into martial contests, such as this interdictor-smuggler 
context: 
(1) A range of realistic, complex behaviors can emerge from the interaction of 
two hostile, intelligent agents acting under simple rules within a dynamic environment of 
uncertainty and danger.  
(2) We can gain insight into these complex situations through heuristics that 
combine complementary optimization, stochastic, and game-theoretic models under an 
umbrella of simulation.  
This study is meant to be a prototype, demonstrating the power of a hybrid model. 
As a prototype, it is not without limitations. We make several assumptions on the method 
and speed by which hostile agents might evolve in a martial context. Additionally, we do 
not include the advantage obtained by interrogation and exploitation after the capture of 
enemy forces and materiel. Lastly, the duration of our computational cases is necessarily 
finite. 
 xx 
Future research could address these assumptions or admit real-world data to craft 
a wider array of smuggling networks or specific instances of interest. Under a broader set 
of configurations, models similar to ours could prove to be a great aid to training inter-
agency decision makers and their staff. That training could encourage unique 
perspectives and seed important questions that might expose highly non-intuitive and 
indirect ways of influencing the outcome and assessing performance during real 
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This thesis describes, develops, and exercises a mathematical model of a contest 
between a smuggler and an interdictor in an effort to study the allocation of interdiction 
resources and choice of smuggling tactics. We use this model to develop insights into 
different structures of such conflicts.  
A. BACKGROUND 
In the wake of two world wars, few modern nation states now choose to face one-
another directly. The last 50 years have instead revealed a distinct rise in war by proxy. 
Malign non-state groups have also gained trans-national influence, threatening the 
strategic goals of many established nations. In response, these nations have increasingly 
turned elements of national power against such antagonists. Infiltration or smuggling and 
efforts to counter them are important features of these contests. 
The U.S. DOD defines infiltration as the movement of small groups or individuals 
into a contested area by avoiding enemy contact (Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command 2001). Similarly, smuggling is defined as the “clandestine transportation of 
goods or persons past a point where prohibited…in violation of the law or other rules” 
(Lehman et al. 2004). Therefore, infiltration and smuggling are closely related. Each 
action is characterized by the contested movement of people, materiel, and information 
from a safe haven to a target operating area where these items find payoff. In armed 
conflict, the payoff is the focused application of force in time and space to create local 
advantage. The force might manifest as an improvised explosive device, kidnapping, 
ambush, or outright assault. In both war and peace, trafficked illicit goods are shepherded 
to areas of low supply and high demand. The payoff in such areas might be the sale of 
controlled narcotics, arrival of illegal migrants, or distribution of counterfeit currencies. 
The taxation of consumer goods smuggled from Dubai to Pakistan through Afghanistan 
provided an enormous portion of the Taliban’s funding stream in the late 1990s and early 
2000s (Rubin 2000). It is apparent that a government must guard against both smuggling 
and infiltration to maintain sovereignty.  
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In a failed or failing state, the government lacks sufficient influence to enforce 
control over some or all of its territory. Malign actors can further destabilize the weak 
government by fomenting an insurgency. Counterinsurgency operations are one method 
the host government can employ to resist the destabilizing agents. Counterinsurgency 
operations consist of offensive, defensive, and stability activities (United States 
Department of the Army 2008). Both the insurgent and counterinsurgent use 
unconventional warfare in pursuit of their respective aims.  
Smuggling and infiltration are important features of unconventional warfare. 
Faced with a more numerous and better-equipped opponent, the insurgent’s challenge is 
to create a temporary advantage through asymmetric means. The asymmetry involves a 
brief concentration of forces and materiel. Because the insurgent must maintain a low 
signature, maintaining a large, local stock of resources is risky. The insurgent must 
instead keep his primary sources of supply at a distance and disperse in the face of 
massed counterinsurgent forces. The high dispersion of both insurgent forces and 
materiel requires active and consistent lines of communication with a supporting 
organization for the insurgent to maintain any tactically significant level of activity. 
These lines of communication usually connect a safe haven (source) and target 
operating environment (target). Within the source, sanctuary can be provided by political 
or military sponsors or even exceptionally difficult terrain. In either case, the source lies 
beyond the operational reach of the counterinsurgent. An intermediate area (a network of 
routes) connects the source and target. In the intermediate area, the insurgent can 
infiltrate forces and supplies. Of equal importance, intelligence and casualties can be 
transported away from the target or exfiltrated. Both the aforementioned infiltration and 
exfiltration are accomplished with the aid of a smuggler. For the smuggler, the 
intermediate area comprises his trade routes (Figure 1).  
In the intermediate area, threat and opportunity meet. Here also, the 
counterinsurgent can act as interdictor, executing tactical action to disrupt the smuggler’s 
activities, and thus the insurgent’s lines of communication. Often of limited tactical 
interest, the intermediate area is strategically vital to both the insurgent and 
counterinsurgent. The success of interdiction or smuggling in the intermediate area can 
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isolate or relieve a contested area elsewhere, proving decisive. Because of the close 
relationship between smuggling and infiltration in the tactical context we describe, this 
thesis treats these terms as tacitly equivalent and we use the terms interchangeably. 
Figure 1. The Source, Target, and Intermediate Area. 
 
Lines of communication connect a safe haven (source) and target operating area (target) 
via a contested intermediate area (network of routes). Smugglers facilitate the movement 
of forces and materiel to forward insurgents through the network of routes. 
Smuggling routes composing the insurgent’s lines of communication are often 
small in number and change only after proving untenable. Operational experience ranging 
from the Vietnam War to more modern conflicts in the Middle East supports this point. 
The Ho Chi Minh trail was an essential lifeline for both the North Vietnamese Army and 
their proxies in the south, the Viet Cong (Prados 1999). Significant interdiction efforts by 
allied forces failed to alter this route despite practical alternatives (Prados 1999). In 
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Operation Iraqi Freedom, infiltration routes, or “ratlines,” also tended to be highly 
consistent despite vast expanses of traversable desert. The constancy of insurgent lines of 
communication across the Durand Line, a line that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan, is 
similarly long-observed. Fighters, weapons, minerals, raw ores, and a vast spectrum of 
consumer goods still flow unabated over the same ground used to illicitly cross the 
Durand Line since the 1890s (Omrani 2009).  
The above consistency makes lines of communication ripe for interdiction 
operations but poses a new issue. The sheer length and number of routes prevents would-
be interdictors from maintaining persistent coverage of their entirety. Temporary outposts 
may be constructed, but smugglers quickly adjust routes around these obvious obstacles. 
Therefore, mobility is key and requires a large commitment of resources to even produce 
episodic concentrations of effectual combat power. The tactical problem is one highly 
sensitive to information and timing.  
The smuggler and interdictor are thus locked in an asymmetric struggle 
characterized by extremely transient actions. A highly aggregate view of these actions 
might provoke a perspective that the interdictor-smuggler struggle is relatively stationary, 
each contest a repetition of the last with only some variance in the outcome. However, at 
the tactical level no combat is stationary; similar actions evoke wholly new responses 
when repeated. The new responses then generate new circumstances under which the 
interdictor and smuggler meet. A highly aggregate view that discounts the path-
dependence of combat is seldom informative to problems of directing tactical action.  
Tactical actions are focused and do not occur with consistent tempo. Preparation 
for some interdiction missions requires days, weeks, or even months. In execution, the 
resulting engagement between smuggler and interdictor is often resolved in seconds or 
minutes. The statistical average level of combat activity does not exist in the above 
reality. Each interdiction and smuggled shipment is unique but related to those that came 
before it. Both the interdictor and smuggler face a series of linked tactical problems, not 
one problem repeated in time. 
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Interdictors can employ combat power in various forms to address these tactical 
problems. Random patrolling, outposts, aerial reconnaissance, harassing fires, and 
ambushes are past examples of combat power employed in support of interdiction. No 
matter the specific form, these actions lie on a spectrum from overt to covert. The level of 
observability depends on the interdiction effort. A patrol conducted in the desert by 
armored vehicle would be highly overt. Dust clouds of approaching vehicles are visible 
for tens of miles. Conversely, high-altitude reconnaissance assets would be nearly 
invisible to a smuggler, and thus covert. Some activities, such as small ambush patrols, 
might lie somewhere in between these extremes. 
Smugglers have their own spectrum of methods to maintain freedom of maneuver 
on their critical lifelines. They often use camouflage and concealment in non-traditional 
ways by disguising their activities as the movement of licit goods. Sophisticated 
observation networks warn smugglers of impending threats and offer direction to safer 
passage. The size of smuggled shipments also varies greatly, ranging from entire 
truckloads of weapons to information passed on a single flash memory card. 
Both the interdictor and smuggler confront a situation full of complexity and 
ambiguity. A difference between orientation and reality is assured. The individual ability 
of the interdictor and smuggler to reconcile the difference between perception and reality 
by adapting assumptions and evaluating information within an evolving context is a 
significant factor in the conduct and result of the interdictor-smuggler struggle. Any 
analysis of an interdictor-smuggler problem must then consider the scenario’s history as 
context. If adjusting perception to reality is paramount to success in the interdictor-
smuggler context, it also suggests that the uncertainty level of the interdictor or smuggler 
may only have meaning in view of the other’s relative information level. 
Recent events show the importance of this interdictor-smuggler problem in stark 
relief. Within the last two years, criminal networks aided the infiltration of over 36,000 
foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq (see Figure 2), swelling the Islamic State’s ranks 
(Dilanian 2016). As of 17 August 2015, over 250,000 people died and 13,500,000 fled as 
a direct result of the fighting, creating a global humanitarian crisis (United Nations 
Officer for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2016). The impact of infiltration 
 6 
was also apparent in Paris (2015) and Belgium (2016), when terrorists, trained in Syria, 
murdered more than 200 civilians in areas otherwise thought secure and gained the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) a strategic information victory (Almasy 2015, 
Shoichet 2016). 




While it is unlikely that the flow of fighters, materiel, or terrorists can be 
completely stopped, more well-coordinated interdiction efforts can significantly influence 
smuggling behaviors and potentially seize key shipments. These behavioral changes and 
the threat of interdiction could help drive criminal smuggling organizations from 
cooperating with terror groups, further limiting the scope and impact of either’s activities. 
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The study of this interdictor-smuggler contest is important, yet difficult. There is 
no single, natural methodology to address this scenario with the features we have 
suggested, and it does not gracefully decompose into sub-processes that submit to 
isolated analysis and produce meaningful results. As a result, making robust statements of 
cause and effect is problematic in these circumstances. However, by using a family of 
analytical techniques, it is possible to comment on emergent patterns that reflect the 
situation’s time dynamics and eventual rest points.    
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND SCOPE 
In this thesis we consider a resource allocation problem faced by the interdictor, 
specifically, where to position limited combat power along suspected infiltration routes 
over time. This must be done using incomplete information against an adaptive smuggler. 
The desired objective is to best-disrupt the smuggler’s lines of communication by 
minimizing the amount of materiel or goods travelling from source to target. 
Our approach is bottom up. We merge strong aspects of traditional game theory, 
optimization, stochastics, and simulation. First, we design a game with simple rules to 
examine patterns of interest and search for recognizable emergent behaviors. This game 
is instantiated in a terminating discrete event simulation. By repeating this simulation in a 
variety of configurations, each continued over a finite number of time steps, we study the 
time dynamics of our problem in a spectrum of situations. Through this evolution of play, 
we examine the robustness of interdictor resource allocation policies and smuggling 
tactics. Lastly, we search for emergent relationships during play. 
Our computational study begins with traditional relaxations that include perfect 
information for the interdictor and smuggler. We then demonstrate the effect of private 
information for each player. Both the interdictor and smuggler must make estimations 
and decisions because of the partial information on their antagonist’s current state and 
designs. Private information and estimation introduces adaptive play under uncertainty. 
We assess the value of this feature. Next, we simulate games configured with several 
specific interdictor and smuggler policies. Finally, we examine each game’s time 
dynamics and end-results through the lens described above. 
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We have several goals. First, we aim to expose practical insights for decision 
makers within a counterinsurgency or counter-illicit trafficking setting. Our study should 
highlight otherwise-obscure relationships between interdiction policy and outcome while 
identifying realistic ways to increase the effectiveness by which resources are allocated. 
We expect the results could bring attention to scenarios that military decision makers 
might neither be able nor want to explore, due to a lack of information and human bias, 
respectively. Our formulation and results might suggest the importance of many features 
otherwise absent from current models. Some implications of our model may conflict with 
prior beliefs, provoking new questions and lines of research inquiry. Lastly, we strive to 
demonstrate an analytic way to investigate an important, realistic, and yet intensely 
complex problem by rigorously blending several complimentary stochastic, game-
theoretic, and optimization models. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The key features underlying the interdictor-smuggler problem have been given 
significant treatment in both United States military doctrine and Operations Research. 
First, we explain the nature of war as defined in modern U.S. warfare philosophy. Then, 
we examine the attributes describing the essence of conflict: uncertainty, fluidity, and 
adaptation. Next, we review the analytical models that address interdictor-smuggler 
problems. In the survey of analytical techniques, we relate each model’s assumptions to 
the attributes of war as described in U.S. military doctrine. Lastly, we outline the 
contribution of this thesis.  
A. MODERN UNITED STATES WARFARE PHILOSOPHY 
Modern United States military doctrine begins by defining the essence of war. 
The agreed upon definition is: “a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and 
irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other” (Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command 1997). A common view of conflict helps aid interoperability and 
sets the foundation for all further service-level discussions of operations and tactics. The 
Joint Operating Environment leverages the agreed essence of war and “provides a 
perspective on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications” for the near and far term 
security environment facing the United States (U.S. Joint Forces Command 2010). Its key 
points expound on the essence of war and how its precipitates—uncertainty, fluidity, and 
adaptation—will continue to govern the course of events in conflict. Each military 
service devotes extensive discussion throughout their respective capstone doctrine and 
tactical publications to defining and addressing the importance of uncertainty, fluidity, 
and adaptation (e.g., United States Air Force 2003, Department of the Army 2012, 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command 1997, U.S. Navy Doctrine Command 
1995).  
Uncertainty is the prime attribute of war in all U.S. Military doctrine. The U.S. 
Air Force explains that the incompleteness of information is so pervasive on the 
battlefield that it permeates combatants’ views of the enemy, environment, and even their 
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own forces (United States Air Force 2003). Elder (2006), in a study by the Central 
Intelligence Agency, concludes that the accuracy of assimilated information was a 
decisive factor in five strategically significant battles: the First Battle of Bull Run (1861), 
Tannenberg (1914), Midway (1942), Inchon (1950), and the Israeli air strike initiating the 
Six-Day War in 1967. Each Service argues that uncertainty can never be eliminated (e.g., 
Department of the Army 2012). Because of this intractability, the “fog of war” relates 
directly to another concept, fluidity. 
Fluidity communicates the tension of two competing phenomenon, uniqueness 
and dependence. U.S. Marine Corps doctrine establishes that while each combat 
engagement is a unique composition of circumstances, it is also dependent on the myriad 
events before it and determines those engagements that follow it (Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command 1997). The U.S. Army (2012) agrees with the importance of 
examining the path-dependency of each combat, citing that no combat episode can be 
viewed in isolation. They also sustain that no combat episode repeats itself exactly 
(Department of the Army 2012). Each engagement thus requires an original solution 
according to the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command (1995). U.S. Military doctrine concludes 
that because of uncertainty and fluidity, combatants must adapt. 
Adaptation is recognized by U.S. military doctrine as an imperative to success in 
war. Colonel John Boyd, the inventor of the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act decision 
framework, describes adaptation in combat through the lens of orientation (Boyd 1976). 
A combatant’s current awareness and experiences define their orientation, full of 
uncertainty and prejudice. Events not anticipated by this orientation generate surprise. 
Colonel Boyd explains that success in conflict is based primarily on each belligerent’s 
ability to anticipate or recognize these anomalies and then reconcile them quickly and 
accurately (Boyd 1976). The proliferation of Colonel Boyd’s theories during the 1980s 
brought adaptation back into the center of modern military doctrine. His influence is 
readily apparent in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (1997), the Marine Corps’ 
capstone doctrinal publication. It defines adaptation and reinforces the context of 
uncertainty in conflict: 
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War is thus a process of continuous mutual adaptation, of give and take, 
move and countermove…The very nature of war makes certainty 
impossible; all actions in war will be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or 
even contradictory information. (3-4) 
The doctrine and tactics manuals from the other Services also give extensive 
treatment to the importance of adaptation (e.g., U.S. Department of the Army 2008). 
Even today, adaptation remains a centerpiece of martial discussions.    
The authors of U.S. military doctrine, in reviewing the recorded history of human 
conflict and leveraging decades of combat experience, communicate the supreme 
importance uncertainty, fluidity, adaptation, and complexity play in determining the 
outcome of the activities surrounding war. This closely aligns with the author’s own 
combat experience as a counterinsurgent.    
B. OPERATIONS RESEARCH 
The field of Operations Research arose in World War II to provide quantitative 
decision support to both U.S. and UK commanders within the wartime context of 
uncertainty and complexity described above. Its analytical methods were successfully 
applied to a spectrum of problems including convoy protection, amphibious assault, and 
aerial bombardment (Kirby 2003). Project Research ANd Development (RAND) was 
created during this time by General Henry H. Arnold, then commander of the United 
States Army Air Forces (RAND 2016). It was one of the major efforts by the U.S. to 
leverage quantitative analysis for decision support in World War II. The genesis of 
modern interdiction studies occurred within Project RAND.       
1. Cold War Origins   
On 21 May 1999, the United States Air Force declassified a study originally 
commissioned under Project RAND in 1955 (Harris and Ross 1955). It revealed the first 
modern mathematical model that we would recognize as network interdiction. The study 
describes a mathematical problem to identify a set of most vital routes within a 
transportation system whose removal would completely stop all movement. This problem 
has been extended in a number of directions, now commonly describing a contest 
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between two completely opposed and intelligent adversaries seeking, respectively, to 
inhibit or enhance the flow from one or more source nodes to one or more target nodes 
within a network. An explosion of additional interest since the 1990s has resulted in 
myriad techniques that now attempt to treat both a variety of contexts and assumptions 
through several related general formulations. (For further information, see Alderson et al. 
[2013] for a detailed treatment of this problem and references to subsequent work.) 
Harris and Ross advocated a basic model now referred to as k-most vital arcs. In 
the context of a potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe, they sought to stop the flow 
of reinforcements within the Soviet railway network. These forces and materiel would 
transit from sources within the Eastern Soviet Union to destinations in the western 
reaches of the Soviet Union and her satellite states in Eastern Europe. Recognizing that 
contemporary methods were inadequate, they instead postulated a holistic view that 
considered both primary and alternate routes and aggregated railway-operating divisions. 
Their solution identifies a “bottleneck,” a set of arcs that, if cut by aerial strikes, would 
completely interdict all western flow (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. The Contemporary Railway System of the U.S.S.R. with 
Identified “Bottleneck” as depicted by Harris and Ross. Source: Harris 
and Ross (1955). 
 
Nodes represent aggregate railway operating divisions and arc information represents the 
capacity in thousands of tons that can be moved between divisions in one day. 
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Importantly, Harris and Ross (1955) comment on two aspects of the problem that 
must be considered: 
As in many military operations, however, the success of interdiction 
depends largely on how complete, accurate, and timely is the 
commander’s information, particularly concerning the effect of his 
interdiction-program efforts on the enemy’s capability to move men and 
supplies. (iii) 
…it is fully recognized that the difficulties inherent in obtaining, 
evaluating, and disseminating intelligence would limit the usefulness of 
the method in direct proportion to the information placed at the disposal of 
the particular specialist concerned. (2) 
We argue that in many martial circumstances, such as the interdictor-smuggler 
scenario we posit, Harris and Ross have identified an intractable factor of these problems, 
not an inconvenience that can be overcome in assumptions. A number of interdiction 
models have addressed this issue directly or made strong assumptions concerning it for 
tractability. 
2. Basic Models 
There are several basic types of interdiction models. First, Harris and Ross (1955) 
propose to estimate the maximum railway network flow by identifying and then 
calculating the capacity of limiting bottlenecks, as described above. In 1963, Wollmer 
followed the work of Harris and Ross, describing a model that maximally reduces flow 
through a rail system by finding and cutting the most vital arc. Corely and Sha (1982) 
extended this model to consider weighted arcs and nodes but proposed only binary 
interdiction of identified arcs to minimize the maximum possible flow. In this sense, arcs 
are either completely cut or left uninhibited. Fulkerson and Harding (1977) adopt another 
model, shortest path interdiction, seeking to maximize the minimum source-target (s-t) 
path subject to a budget constraint. These basic ideas have been merged by Malik et al. 
(1989), where the k-most vital arcs are interdicted with the goal of maximally increasing 
the length of the shortest s-t path. Israeli and Wood (2002) formulate this method as a bi-
level program, introducing “supervalid inequalities” and greatly decreasing 
computational time. The third basic model is called maximum flow interdiction. Under 
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this perspective, arc costs or capacities are degraded to minimize the maximum possible 
flow (Wollmer 1964). In the shadow of the Vietnam War, these models were applied 
most directly to attacking enemy logistics systems (Ghare 1971, Ratliff et al. 1975). 
Importantly, these basic models assume that both interdictor and evader have perfect 
knowledge of both the environment and one another’s range of potential actions. 
Competing, intelligent adversaries have been an implicit feature of all of these 
models. Typically cast as two-person zero-sum games, network interdiction problems 
closely align with game theory. Danskin (1966) establishes the foundation of a 
generalized theory and solution method for these max-min problems. For exposition, he 
proposes a situation in which a defender installs fortifications and then an attacker plans a 
strategy with full knowledge of the location of these installations. This kind of sequential 
gaming format is closely related to a Stackelberg game and commonly referred to as such 
within modern network interdiction literature (von Stackelberg 1952). See Wood (2011) 
and references therein for a thorough discussion. Simultaneous gaming constructs have 
also been applied to network interdiction models, but this is less common. Washburn and 
Wood (1995) addressed the interdiction of illicit drugs by method of maximum flow 
interdiction and simultaneous gaming. While these models describe a complex problem, 
they still describe one in which the possible state space is known with certainty. 
3. Introduction of Uncertainty 
Natural extensions of these models include the introduction of uncertainty. 
Stochastic network interdiction models were first introduced by Cormican et al. (1998). 
Here the success of an interdictor’s attacks is binary but uncertain. Extensions are 
described that include uncertainty in arc capacities but require certainty in attack outcome 
(Cormican et al. 1998). Several efforts in support of counter-nuclear smuggling have 
formulated and solved stochastic network interdiction problems (Morton et al. 2007). In 
these problems, arc costs represent detection probabilities. The interdictor’s goal is thus 
to maximize this probability across all possible infiltration paths given an unknown 
smuggler origin. Using a logarithmic transformation, the model then becomes 
deterministic. Even so, the model is stochastic in the whole because the smuggler’s origin 
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is described by a probability distribution. Nehme (2009) extends this model by examining 
sequential, simultaneous, and then hybrid games where only a portion of the radiation 
sensors are made visible to the smuggler. Further relaxations are often noted as 
intractable under the above formulations. 
These stochastic programming models indirectly include asymmetric information. 
Several recent studies have explicitly made this inclusion but maintained static network 
character and do not consider time dynamics. Uniquely, Salmeron (2012) explores 
deception tactics under network interdiction. He formulates a multi-objective bi-level 
program that optimally locates a number of covert sensors, overt sensors, and decoys. As 
in the counter-nuclear smuggling models above, the focus of this interdictor is to 
maximize the probability of detection for a single evader. He notes that the computational 
time to reach solutions within this model is extensive. 
Asymmetry of information has been treated extensively in game theory literature. 
The literature centers on a problem of exploration and exploitation, commonly now 
referred to as the multi-armed bandit problem (Robbins 1952). Within this problem, a 
gambler is faced with a number of slot machines, each of which produces outcomes 
drawn from a unique distribution. The gambler must then decide how to balance 
exploration by playing various machines to forecast which will provide the highest 
reward and actually exploiting this information by playing this subset of machines. The 
aim is to maximize the sum of rewards. More nefarious versions have been proposed that 
pit the player against a malicious casino that controls the game payoffs (Auer 1995).  
These multi-armed bandit problems attempt to confront directly the military 
intelligence problem described by Harris and Ross and implicitly linked to practical 
network interdiction. Coping with initially incomplete information that can be uncovered 
in time requires feedback mechanisms. This presents problems with dynamic instead of 
static data.  
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4. Dynamic Data 
Zinkevich (2003) introduces online optimization for repeated games by convex 
programming in an attempt to address the challenge of dynamic data. This method can be 
described by a procedure that is performed in every time step:  
1. Choose an action.  
2. Simultaneously an adversary selects an action. 
3. Suffer loss that is a function of both selected actions. 
4. Observe the adversary’s action.  
The objective is to minimize the cumulative loss over time (Bubeck 2011). In this 
protocol, feedback is perfect, or transparent; the player is informed of the adversary’s 
complete actions without error. Awerbuch (2004) addresses a minimum delay routing 
shortest path optimization problem with opaque feedback. Here a malicious and adaptive 
adversary’s actions only partially reveal the underlying network structure. True arc costs 
are made visible just on selected paths. Similar formulations also provide the forecaster 
with a subset of the true loss vector (Cesa-Bianchi et al. 2012). It is apparent that these 
models attempt to confront more directly exploration-exploitation issues that emerge in 
dynamic optimization problems. 
Online stochastic optimization convolutes the problem by further limiting 
feedback. One of the goals of the limited feedback models is to explore the strategies 
required to cope with partial information scenarios. Bubeck (2011) defines bandit 
feedback as feedback wherein the player observes the adversary’s moves only indirectly, 
confounded with other factors. The semi-bandit version allows perfect loss information, 
but only in areas explored by that turn’s active strategy (Bubeck 2011). 
A most recent effort executes network interdiction across time with feedback. 
Borrero et al. (2015) address sequential shortest path interdiction with partial 
information. The interdictor has incomplete knowledge, but the evader has complete 
knowledge. As the evader traverses the network turn-by-turn, additional arcs and accurate 
costs are revealed to the interdictor through semi-bandit feedback. The authors suggest 
assessing interdictor policies by time stability and efficiency. This time stability is the 
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number of time steps required before chosen strategies match those of a player with 
perfect knowledge called the oracle (Borrero et al. 2015). In this case, the adversary is 
myopic and non-adaptive. 
With the rise in computational power and development of newer decomposition 
methods, modern network interdiction studies are now able to handle what would have 
been prohibitively large problem instances in the time of Harris and Ross. However, 
reflecting again on their admonitions concerning imperfect information and time 
sensitivity, we can see that modern techniques still require a multitude of strong 
assumptions that ignore the important effects of two-sided asymmetric information, path-
dependency, and adaptation. We argue that these assumptions have played a role in 
limiting both the scope of current network interdiction research and practical utility of 
some results. 
C. OUR CONTRIBUTION IN CONTEXT 
We propose a novel network interdiction model that reconciles many operational 
realities identified by military literature. We believe that significant insight can be gained 
into heretofore underrepresented or excluded problems within these operational realities. 
We pursue this insight by simultaneously relaxing many of the previous network 
interdiction modelling assumptions listed above. The local counterinsurgent-smuggler 
contest described in Chapter 1 is one example in this class of problems. For this problem, 
we conduct network interdiction within a dynamic network, under partial information, 
using incomplete feedback, and allowing two-sided adaptive play. We combine these 
aspects in an evolutionary game, leveraging optimization, simulation, and stochastics to 
achieve a hybrid model. 
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III. MODEL FORMULATION 
In this chapter, we describe a game and corresponding mathematical model 
formulation for gaining insights into realistic smuggling and interdiction scenarios. First, 
we define the objectives, rules, interactions, and challenges that form the game. Next, we 
explore a series of constructive modelling cases to demonstrate the effect of each major 
modelling assumption. We then explain the mathematical formulation of our game. 
A. THE GAME 
We design a game in which two players with opposing goals make decisions that 
govern the movement of materiel across a network. The game is played in discrete 
periods called rounds. The goal of the first player, named the smuggler, is to move as 
much of this materiel as possible from one or more sources to a single target. Opposing 
the smuggler is the second player, called the interdictor, who attempts to stop this 
materiel from reaching the appointed target. Each round of the game produces a score 
that represents the total materiel delivered to the target in that round of play. Playing the 
game under different scenarios allows for the relative evaluation of various tactics and 
provides insights into phenomena modelled by the game. 
The game proceeds over a finite number of rounds. Neither player knows the total 
number of rounds within a game. Each round involves several decisions by both the 
smuggler and interdictor. While these two players make some decisions in turn, they also 
make some decisions simultaneously. The outcome of a player’s decisions is stochastic. 
Each player updates the information used to make their decisions based on these results. 
Score is recorded. The game then proceeds to the next round.  
The smuggler and interdictor play this game on a network described by a directed 
graph consisting of nodes and arcs. Nodes represent an origin, destination, or 
intermediate location for materiel flow. Thus, both the source and target are nodes. There 
can be multiple sources within a game and even within a single round of play but only 
one target. Nodes have unbounded storage capacity. Arcs represent potential movement 
of flow from one node to another node. There is only one arc between any pair of nodes, 
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and the underlying graph is acyclic. These two characteristics make the network a feed 
forward network. Each arc has a unique cost and capacity. The cost represents the 
amount of work required to move one unit of materiel from the node at the tail of the arc 
to the node at the head of the arc within a single round of play. Similarly, the capacity 
describes the maximum amount of materiel that can be moved within a round of play 
across the respective arc. 
Materiel moves in discrete units called packets. Each packet has two attributes: a 
source and a size. The size of the packet describes the amount of materiel contained 
within the packet. Different packets can have different sizes, but the size of each packet is 
fixed. A packet’s source and the target determine the node in which the packet enters the 
game and the node from which the packet can exit the game, respectively. Packets 
reaching the assigned target node within a round count toward the score. The round’s 
score is tallied by summing the sizes of these packets. 
Both the smuggler and interdictor play the game by making different decisions in 
the context of individual budgets. The smuggler decides how to use a finite budget to 
move the packets through the network. This budget, the movement budget, can change by 
game round. Each packet moves as a unit. Within a round, the length of movement may 
be limited to one arc or extend to the entire set of arcs connecting the source and target 
nodes. Alternatively, the smuggler may decide not to move some packets at all within a 
game round.  
The interdictor decides where to place a limited number of sensors to discover the 
packets and prevent them from reaching the target. A sensor budget limits the number of 
sensors the smuggler may place in a game round. As with the smuggler, this budget can 
change by round. Once placed, we assume a sensor lasts only one round. Sensors are 
either overt or covert. Overt sensors are visible to the smuggler while covert sensors are 
not. Both types of sensors are placed upon arcs. The interdictor may place only one 
sensor of any type upon any one arc in any one round of the game. Packets passing over 
an arc on which a sensor is placed are candidates for detection. This detection is random 
and the probability of detection is a function of the packet’s size and the number of past 
detections on the arc. Even so, the interdictor does not know the probability of detection. 
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The interdictor automatically attacks detected packets, destroying them. We remove 
destroyed packets from the game. 
The information of both the smuggler and interdictor is always incomplete. Even 
so, the information is incomplete in fundamentally different ways. The smuggler lacks 
complete awareness of all available arcs, and the interdictor is uncertain of all arc and 
node attributes. Both players formulate estimates to augment this partial information. The 
smuggler’s estimates of arc costs and capacities are equal to the ground truth arc costs 
and capacities. However, the set of arcs visible to the smuggler is a subset of the ground 
truth arcs. The visibility of an arc is controlled by a clock that reveals the arc to the 
smuggler in a predefined round. After an arc becomes visible, it is always visible.  
The interdictor also has an estimate of network information and smuggler 
decisions. A limited feedback loop informs the interdictor’s sensor placements by 
formulating a private view of arc capacity, arc cost, and the location of the packets. 
Because the estimated locations and target of the packets—the estimated node supplies 
and demands—shifts round-to-round, and the interdictor is attempting to prevent the 
smuggler’s flow, the interdictor considers different arcs in each round. Through feedback 
loops, “learning,” and “forgetting” occurs. Each player then adapts to better inform their 
play and commit resources.  
We apply a transformation function to all the arcs within the game at the end of 
each round. This function reduces each arc’s cost by a fractional amount every round for 
three purposes. First, the transformation function implements the count-down timer to 
reveal non-visible arcs to the smuggler. Second, the transformation function simulates 
smuggler learning by decreasing the cost to transport materiel in successive rounds. 
Third, the transformation function attenuates the smuggler’s cost increase resultant from 
any loss of materiel incurred during previous game rounds. The combination of the 
transformation function and evolving player’s estimates gives the network a dynamic 
character. 
We consider numerous scenarios under which the interdictor and smuggler play 
the game, in order to evaluate a spectrum of smuggler and interdictor policies. Modifying 
the sensor budget, movement budget, or other parameters can cause each player to use 
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different tactics and allow one to study the effectiveness of a number of styles of play. It 
is then possible to examine the relative value of each tactic and make observations on the 
progression of play within the game in order to draw more general conclusions on 
phenomena that might be well-represented by this game. 
B. THE I-I/S SIMULATION ALGORITHM 
We develop an heuristic algorithm to simulate the time-ordered decisions made 
by the interdictor and smuggler in the game described in Section A (Figure 4). Within the 
algorithm, we formulate the game as two-stage sequential: Interdictor – 
Interdictor/Smuggler (I-I/S). In the second step of the round, “Interdictor/Smuggler,” 
play is simultaneous. The interdictor and smuggler play the game over a finite number of 
rounds.    
The algorithm allows us to explore the performance of both the interdictor and 
smuggler under various individual resource allocation policies. We instantiate the 
algorithm in a terminating discrete event simulation. Evaluation of the output provides 
feasible, face valid solutions to various interdictor-smuggler problem instances. 
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Figure 4. The I-I/S Simulation Algorithm. 
 
The time-ordered steps of the I-I/S game algorithm. Nine initial inputs set the specific 
scenario. At each step in the algorithm, one or both players makes decisions based upon 
or adjusts a prescriptive model that represents their current state of knowledge about the 
system and the actions (so far) of their opponent, and explicitly models any limitations of 
this information and any uncertainty in the outcome of their actions. After a pre-
determined number of game rounds T, the algorithm generates both time-series and finite 
time horizon aggregate outputs. 
C. CONSTRUCTIVE CASES 
We explore a series of constructive cases to demonstrate the effect of each major 
modelling constraint (Table 1). Each constructive case considers the same problem 
instance involving six nodes, two of which are sources and one of which is the target for 
the smuggler (Table 2 and Figure 5). We use these cases as illustrative examples to 
further explain game play and to argue that the admixture of the constraints found in our 
full model is necessary to properly explore the interdictor-smuggler resource allocation 
problem. 
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Table 1.  List of Constructive Cases. 
 
Table 2.  Parameters and Values for the Problem Instance Simulated in 
Cases 1–5. 
Interdictor Budget (sensor budget) 1 Overt Sensor and 1 Covert Sensor / round 
Smuggler Budget (movement budget) 25 / round 
Packets 3 packets / round 
Number of round played 3 rounds / Case 
Figure 5. Network Configuration and Packet Schedule for 
Constructive Cases. 
 
Left: The network configuration for all constructive cases. Nodes N1 and N2 act as 
sources, node N6 acts as the target. Right: The schedule of packets for all computational 
cases. The schedule introduces seven total packets, all of size 1, throughout the game. 
Note that in round three, the schedule introduces two packets at node N1. 
 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Multi-period X X X X X 
Asymmetric cost and capacity information   X   X X 
Limited cost and capacity feedback   X   X X 
Packet locations unknown to interdictor     X X X 
New arcs revealed by timer         X 
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1. Case 1: Multi-period, Symmetric Information 
In Case 1, we assume both the smuggler and interdictor observe the same arc 
costs and capacities. The interdictor has perfect information of the system state. All 
packet locations are transparent. The smuggler can see overt sensors but is not able to see 
covert sensors. Because the smuggler can neither observe nor predict the placement of 
covert sensors, he moves packets in a greedy, myopic fashion along budget feasible 
paths. The entire set of arcs is visible to the smuggler throughout the game. Figure 6 
displays the time-ordered steps of the game algorithm for constructive case 1. Figures 7–
9 display the decisions, information, and outcomes of three rounds played under Case 1. 
Figure 6. The I-I/S Game Algorithm, Case 1. 
 
The time-ordered steps of the game algorithm for constructive Case 1. In Case 1, the 
interdictor has perfect information of the system state, requiring neither estimation nor 
learning on his part. The smuggler is able to view all arcs within the network during all 
rounds of play. Detection success is stochastic. The Case 1 configuration requires only 
three of the I-I/S game algorithm’s seven steps to instantiate (unnecessary steps in dashed 
gray). 
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Figure 7. Case 1, Round 1 Decisions and Information. 
  
 
The smuggler has two packets at node N2, and the interdictor is aware of all packet 
locations. Left (Interdictor): The interdictor optimally places two sensors to maximize the 
smuggler’s minimum cost of flow. Right (Smuggler): The smuggler is aware of the 
interdictor’s overt sensor on arc (N2, N3), but unaware of the covert sensor on arc (N2, 
N4). He moves two packets to the target at minimum cost based on his partial information 
(dashed). The stochastic result from the two packets passing the covert sensor on arc (N2, 
N4) yields “no detection” for packet 1 but “detection” for packet 2. The interdictor 
destroys the detected packet. Packet 1 reaches the target and records a score of 1. 
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Figure 8. Case 1, Round 2 Decisions and Information. 
 
 
Packet 2 is at node N4 from the previous round, and there are two new packets at source 
node N2. The transformation function updates all arc costs, reducing them. Left 
(Interdictor): Using the same arc attributes as the smuggler in Case 1, the interdictor 
again places sensors optimally. Right (Smuggler): The smuggler attempts to move 
packets 2 and 3 to the target. The stochastic result from these packets passing the covert 
sensor on arc (N4, N6) yields “no detection,” and a score of 2 is recorded.  
Figure 9. Case 1, Round 3 Decisions and Information. 
  
Packet 4 remains from the previous round, and there are three new packets at source 
nodes. The transformation function reduces all arc costs. Left (Interdictor): Aware of all 
supplies and arc costs, the interdictor optimally places sensors to maximize the smugglers 
minimum cost. Right (Smuggler): The smuggler attempts to move two packets to the 
target. Because of the overt sensor on arc (N3, N6), the smuggler does not send packets 6 
and 7, and instead sends packets 4 and 5. The stochastic result from packet 4 and 5 
passing the covert sensor on arc (N2, N4) yields “no detection.” Both packets reach the 
target giving a score of 2. 
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Discussion 
In Case 1, we assume the interdictor is aware of all packet locations. He, 
therefore, places sensors as closely as possible to these known supplies of flow in each 
round. Additionally, because the smuggler and interdictor use the same cost and capacity 
information, the interdictor has a perfect prediction of the smuggler’s packet routing. 
Sensor detection probability is less than 1.0, so even with the completeness of 
information available, five packets still reach the target. The model in Case 1 is very 
similar to previous stochastic network interdiction models where perfect information 
exists, but attack success is uncertain (e.g., Cormican et al. 1998). The assumption of 
perfect information made in Case 1 does not comport well with the key features of the 
interdictor-smuggler problem as posed in Chapters 1 and 2. 
2. Case 2: Multi-period, Asymmetric Cost and Capacity Information, Limited 
Feedback 
In Case 2, we assume the smuggler and interdictor have private arc cost and 
capacity information. Additionally, we suppose that the private cost information is 
substantially different for illustrative purposes. All packet locations are still transparent. 
The interdictor must make a prediction on the smuggler’s movements by forming 
estimates of the arc costs and capacities. Indirect, limited feedback updates the 
information of both the smuggler and interdictor. The smuggler is aware of overt sensors, 
but is never made directly aware of the location of covert sensors. Instead, the smuggler 
is aware of packets destroyed by the interdictor. The smuggler uses these losses to 
estimate heightened detection risk (or threat locations) by increasing his estimate of arc 
cost on the arcs where the interdictor destroyed packets. In similar fashion, successful 
detections reduce the interdictor’s estimate of arc cost and tune his estimate of arc 
capacity. Arc capacity must be at least equal to the amount of materiel detected in a 
single round on the arc. However, the interdictor knows the smuggler’s supply nodes 
because the packet locations are transparent in this case. Lastly, the entire set of arcs is 
visible to the smuggler throughout the game. Figure 10 displays the time-ordered steps of 
the game algorithm for constructive Case 2. Figures 11–13 display the decisions, 
information, and outcomes of three rounds played under Case 2. 
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Figure 10. The I-I/S Game Algorithm, Case 2. 
 
The time-ordered steps of the game algorithm for constructive Case 2. In Case 2, we 
introduce asymmetric information. The information asymmetry requires the interdictor to 
estimate the arc attributes. Even so, the interdictor is aware of all packet locations. Only 
part of the “Interdictor (Prediction)” step is thus required. Both the smuggler and 
interdictor update their incomplete information by limited feedback. However, only one 
of two feedback mechanisms is in place for the interdictor.  
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Figure 11. Case 2, Round 1 Decisions and Information. 
 
This case follows the same packet schedule as before, starting with two packets at source 
node N2. Left (Interdictor): In Case 2, the interdictor must make his own estimate of arc 
attributes. For illustrative purpose, we suppose that these estimates are initially 
substantially different from the smuggler’s information. Even with perfect information on 
the location of all packets in play, the inaccuracy of the interdictor’s initial estimate 
causes the him to sub-optimally place a covert sensor on arc (N3, N6) instead of arc (N2, 
N4). Right (Smuggler): As in Case 1, the smuggler is unable to see covert sensors. He 
moves two packets optimally given his partial information. Packet 1 reaches the target 
and records a score of 1. 
Figure 12. Case 2, Round 2 Decisions and Information. 
 
Left (Interdictor): Through a feedback loop, the interdictor quickly refines his estimate of 
arc attributes, and, in spite of partial information, places two sensors in a worst-case 
manner for the smuggler. Right (Smuggler): In Case 2 the transformation function only 
updates the smuggler’s private arc information. He attempts to move two packets to the 
target, but again only has sufficient budget to move one packet, packet 4, all the way to 
the target, recording a score of 1. 
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Figure 13. Case 2, Round 3 Decisions and Information. 
 
Left (Interdictor): The interdictor has updated his estimates again. However, in spite of 
perfect information of the packet locations, places sensors sub-optimally, as he did in 
round 1. Right (Smuggler): The transformation function again updates the smuggler’s 
information. Limited by budget, the smuggler moves two of three packets with seemingly 
unobstructed paths to the target, recording a score of 2. 
Discussion 
In Case 2, we assume the interdictor is aware of all packet locations. However, he 
must form his own estimate of the arc costs and capacities. The now-inaccurate arc 
information causes the interdictor to place a covert sensor inappropriately in Round 1 
(Figure 11). Were the interdictor aware of the smuggler’s arc information, he would have 
placed the covert sensor more appropriately on arc (N2, N4) as in Case 1, Round 1 
(Figure 7). The consequences of the miscalculation allow the smuggler to take advantage 
of an unimpeded path by moving packet 1 to the target for score. Even so, the interdictor 
is able to rapidly adjust his estimate and more-appropriately place sensors in the next 
round. The introduction of asymmetric arc cost and capacity information immediately 
shows a difference in the accuracy of decisions made by the interdictor and smuggler. 
The model in Case 2 bears similarity to previous work using limited feedback (e.g., 
Bubeck 2011). We argue that a model of the interdictor-smuggler problem must include 
asymmetric information; however, assuming that the interdictor knows the location of all 
smuggled materiel as it moves is problematic. We examine this further in Case 3.  
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3. Case 3: Multi-period, Symmetric Cost and Capacity Information, Packet 
Locations Unknown to Interdictor, Limited Feedback 
In Case 3, we assume the smuggler and interdictor have access to the same arc 
costs and capacities. However, packet locations are private, known only to the smuggler. 
The interdictor uses the size and location of destroyed packets as feedback to estimate the 
smuggler’s supply nodes. The smuggler can observe overt sensor locations, but cannot 
see covert sensor locations. The smuggler uses the same cost and capacity feedback loop 
found in Case 2 to update his estimates of arc costs. The interdictor has access to these 
estimates of arc cost and capacity. The entire set of arcs is visible to the smuggler 
throughout the game. Figure 14 displays the time-ordered steps of the game algorithm for 
constructive Case 3. Figures 15–17 display the decisions, information, and outcomes of 
three rounds played under Case 3. 
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Figure 14. The I-I/S Game Algorithm, Case 3. 
 
The time-ordered steps of the game algorithm for constructive Case 3. In Case 3, the 
information asymmetry is of a different type than that found in Case 2. The interdictor 
and smuggler share the same estimate of the arc attributes, but the location of the packets 
is private, known only to the smuggler. The interdictor uses a limited feedback 
mechanism to attempt to compensate for the incomplete information.  
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Figure 15. Case 3, Round 1 Decisions and Information. 
 
This case follows the same packet schedule as the previous ones. Left (Interdictor): As in 
Case 2, the interdictor is aware of the smuggler’s information on arc attributes. However, 
the interdictor can no longer see the packet locations and must estimate them. We 
suppose his initial guess is inaccurate, estimating 1 unit of supply each at nodes N4 and 
N5. Right (Smuggler): The smuggler is unable to see covert sensors. He attempts to move 
packet 2 to the target based on his partial information. Of note, the chosen s-t path (N2-
N4-N5-N6), is not the shortest path. However, it moves the same amount of materiel 
forward as the shortest path (N2-N3-N6). We see some diversity among budget-feasible 
paths because the smuggler is attempting to move as much flow as far forward as 
possible within a budget that does not roll-over round-to-round. With a budget of 25 
units, both paths (N2-N3-N6) and (N2-N4-N5-N6) fall within the smuggler’s indifference 
threshold. He treats them equally. The stochastic result from packet 2 passing the covert 




Figure 16. Case 3, Round 2 Decisions and Information. 
 
Left (Interdictor): The interdictor estimates two packets each at nodes N3, N4, and N5. 
However, without perfect knowledge of packet locations, the interdictor keeps sensors 
close to the target, sub-optimally placing them based on updated supply estimates at 
nodes N4 and N5. Right (Smuggler): The transformation function updates the smuggler’s 
private estimate of arc attributes. He attempts to move packet 3 to the target, while 
moving packet 1 toward the target. The stochastic result from packet 3 passing the covert 
sensor on arc (N4, N6) yields “no detection.” Packet 3 reaches the target, increasing the 
total score by 1. 
Figure 17. Case 3, Round 3 Decisions and Information. 
 
 
Left (Interdictor): Using feedback from round 2, the interdictor refines his estimate of 
packet locations. Because of persistent imperfections in this estimate, the interdictor 
again places sensors poorly, even with perfect information of the smuggler’s arc 
attributes. Right (Smuggler): After the transformation function updates the smuggler’s 
information, the smuggler attempts to move two packets to the target. The stochastic 
result from packet 4 passing the covert sensor on arc (N4, N6) yields “no detection.” 
Packets 4 and 7 reach the target, increasing the total score by 2. 
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Discussion 
In Case 3, we assume the interdictor is now unaware of all packet locations, but 
sees the same arc costs and capacities as the smuggler. The now-hidden packets 
dramatically affect both the interdictor’s and smuggler’s decisions. Throughout Case 3, 
the interdictor places his sensors much closer to the target than in Cases 1 and 2. 
Uncertainty on the origin of smuggler packets greatly complicates the interdictor’s 
problem because any of the five nodes could act as a source of flow. While the sensors 
are optimally placed given the interdictor’s estimates of supply, their location is sub-
optimal every round when compared to what could be achieved with the ground truth. 
Case 3 demonstrates the significant impact on both the decisions and outcome of the 
game when the interdictor has incomplete information of the packet’s locations.  
Additionally, Case 3 illustrates smuggler selection diversity amongst several 
budget-feasible paths. Given that the smuggler is unable to roll-over any excess 
movement budget round-to-round, two paths that move an equal amount of materiel 
forward in a game round both lie within the smuggler’s indifference threshold. The 
smuggler may then equally choose either path (Figure 15). (For further information, see 
Stewart et al. [2013] for a detailed treatment of indifference thresholds and other 
multicriteria decision-making.)  
The model in Case 3 is similar to previous models that assume the interdictor and 
smuggler both know the probability of detection on each arc but that the smuggler’s 
origins are unknown to the interdictor (e.g., Morton et al. 2007). The obscurity of packet 
locations assumed in Case 3 aligns well with the author’s own observations in combat 
during counter-trafficking and counter-infiltration operations. However, the assumption 
of perfect cost and capacity information is difficult to reconcile with the same operational 
experiences. We relax both assumptions in Case 4.   
4. Case 4: Multi-Period, Asymmetric Cost and Capacity Information, Packet 
Locations Unknown to Interdictor, Limited Feedback 
In Case 4, we combine the restrictions from Case 2 and Case 3. We assume the 
smuggler and interdictor make decisions with private arc cost and capacity information. 
They both use limited feedback from packets destroyed in each round to update their 
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information. The packet locations are not known to the interdictor and must be estimated. 
As in previous cases, the entire set of arcs is visible to the smuggler throughout the game. 
Figure 18 displays the time-ordered steps of the game algorithm for constructive Case 4. 
Figures 19–21 display the decisions, information, and outcomes of three rounds played 
under Case 4. 
Figure 18. The I-I/S Game Algorithm, Case 4. 
 
The time-ordered steps of the game algorithm for constructive Case 4. In Case 4, we 
combine the restrictions from Cases 2 and 3. The interdictor must now estimate both the 
arc attributes and packet locations. The interdictor uses two limited feedback mechanisms 
to update his projections of the smuggler’s capabilities and intentions.  
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Figure 19. Case 4, Round 1 Decisions and Information. 
 
Left (Interdictor): The interdictor must estimate both the packet locations and arc 
attributes in Case 4. He places two sensors inaccurately because of the lack of 
information. Right (Smuggler): The smuggler attempts to move packet 1 to target, 
without awareness to the covert sensor. The stochastic result from packet 1 passing the 
covert sensor on arc (N5, N6) yields “no detection.” Packet 1 reaches the target, 
increasing the total score by 1. 
Figure 20. Case 4, Round 2 Decisions and Information. 
 
Left (Interdictor): Now employing two feedback mechanisms, the interdictor more 
accurately estimates the smuggler’s intentions and well-places two sensors on arcs (N3, 
N6) and (N4, N6). Right (Smuggler): The smuggler attempts to move two packets to 
target, without awareness of the covert sensor on arc (N4, N6). The stochastic result is 
that the interdictor detects and destroys packet 2 on arc (N4, N6). 
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Figure 21. Case 4, Round 3 Decisions and Information. 
 
Left (Interdictor): Based on previous two rounds of play, the interdictor orients on node 
N2 as the source of supply. He is surprised by flow originating instead from nodes N1 
and N5 and fails to guard against it. Right (Smuggler): The smuggler updates his 
information based on the packet lost in round 2 and the transformation function. He then 
attempts to move two packets to the target. The stochastic result is that the interdictor 
does not detect packet 2 on arc (N2, N3). Note that packets initially frustrated in the 
network, such as packet 3, may become a threat later. In this case, packet 3 reaches the 
target after the interdictor places sensors further forward.  
Discussion 
In Case 4, the total asymmetry of information again changes the decisions and 
outcomes during game play. Most notably, the interdictor benefits from imperfect 
information on arc cost and capacity. Without direct access to the smuggler’s 
information, the interdictor must use an additional feedback mechanism to form an 
estimate of these parameters based on game play. One feedback mechanism is already in 
use to discern the location of the packets. When the two are combined, the interdictor is 
able to make better projections by using complimentary information. Estimated changes 
in cost resultant from observed packets enable the interdictor to refine the estimates of 
flow sources and lead to better-placed sensors. The interdictor makes decisions based on 
where the smuggler did go, not just where he could go. There were no models found 
during the literature review that included the level of information asymmetry discussed 
above.  
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5. Case 5 (Full Model): Multi-period, Asymmetric Cost and Capacity 
Information, Packet Locations Unknown to Interdictor, Limited Feedback, 
Arcs Revealed by Timer 
Case 5, the full model, includes all of the attributes of Case 4. However, unlike 
Case 4, we assume a count-down timer makes some previously-hidden arcs visible to the 
smuggler as the game progresses. Once visible, arcs are always visible. Figure 22 
displays the time-ordered steps of the game algorithm for constructive case 5. Figures 
23–25 display the decisions, information, and outcomes of three rounds played under 
Case 5. 
Figure 22. The I-I/S Game Algorithm, Case 5. 
 
The time-ordered steps of the game algorithm for constructive Case 5 (the full model). In 
Case 5, we include all of the attributes of Case 4 but now use a countdown timer to hide 
some arcs from the smuggler until round 3. 
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Figure 23. Case 5, Round 1 Decisions and Information. 
 
Left (Interdictor): As in Case 4, the interdictor must estimate both the packet locations 
and arc attributes. He places an overt sensor on (N4, N6) and covert sensor on (N5, N6). 
While these arcs are optimal sensor locations given the interdictor’s current information 
and estimate, they are sub-optimal locations in view of the actual position of the two 
packets. Right (Smuggler): In Case 5, a clock will reveal arcs (N2, N3) and (N3, N6) to 
the smuggler by countdown timer in round 3. These arcs are not yet visible in round 1. 
The smuggler is thus far more limited in available routes. By chance, the interdictor’s 
initial estimate aligns well with the limited routes available to the smuggler. The 
stochastic result from packet 2 passing the covert sensor on arc (N5, N6) yields 
“detection.” The interdictor destroys the detected packet. 
Figure 24. Case 5, Round 2 Decisions and Information. 
 
Left (Interdictor): With one detection in the previous round, the interdictor widens his 
estimate of supply nodes to include N3. The interdictor is unaware that arc (N3, N6) is not 
yet visible to the smuggler and treats it as a threat. The interdictor adjusts his estimates of 
arc capacities based on detected flow. The interdictor places two sensors using his current 
information. The placement is again sub-optimal, given the ground truth. Right 
(Smuggler): The smuggler successfully moves packet 1 to the target. 
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Figure 25. Case 5, Round 3 Decisions and Information. 
 
Left (Interdictor): Even with no detections in the previous round, the interdictor is able to 
use his estimate of arc attributes, arc supplies, and score from the previous round to 
improve the accuracy of his information. He correctly identifies node N2 as a source of 
supply and nodes N3 and N5 as threatening. However, the limited smuggling routes that 
allowed the interdictor to gain a detection also created feedback that causes him to orient 
his defense without regard for node N1 as a possible source. Right (Smuggler): The 
countdown timer reveals arcs (N2, N3) and (N3, N6) to the smuggler. The smuggler is 
able to capitalize on the uninhibited s-t path (N1-N3-N6) created by the interdictor’s now-
obsolete sensor orientation to move packet 6 to the target6. The stochastic result of 
packet 3 passing the covert sensor on arc (N4-N6) is “no detection.” 
Discussion 
The time-revelation of new arcs in Case 5 again changes game play. The 
introduction of previously unknown arcs is analogous to opening a new cross-border 
smuggling tunnel. There are other real world examples of new smuggling routes coming 
into use (e.g., Banco 2015). The addition of arcs revealed by timer most affects the 
smuggler’s decisions. By constricting the available set of arcs, the smuggler becomes 
more predictable. In time, the increased predictability would make the interdictor more 
successful. However, once the interdictor is oriented on a specific set of arcs, the 
smuggler’s use of new routes could prove a surprise to the interdictor’s established sensor 
layout. The inclusion of time-delayed arc visibility allows for the investigation of this 
phenomenon and aligns with real world events. 
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Based on discussion in the above constructive examples, we argue that the 
assumptions found in Case 5, the full model, are each significant and well represent the 
key features underlying the interdictor-smuggler problem we describe.  
D. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE I-I/S ALGORITHM 
In this section, we describe the detailed mathematical formulation of each step of the I-
I/S Simulation Algorithm (Figure 26). 
Figure 26. The Steps of the I-I/S Simulation Algorithm. 
 
The numbered steps of the simulation algorithm. Each number corresponds with the 
subsection describing its detailed mathematical formulation. 
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1. (Interdictor) Estimate Network Attributes and Packet Locations 
a.   Introduce New Flow to the Source(s) 
A predefined master schedule controls flow input. We define the master schedule 
a priori and all basic packet attributes within it. It is in table form. Table 3 provides an 
illustrative sample. The smuggler has no foreknowledge of the master schedule. 
Table 3.  Illustrative Sample of Master Packet Flow. 
Round Packet Source Target Size 
1 P1 N1 N6 1 
1 P2 N1 N6 2 
2 P3 N2 N6 3 
3 P4 N1 N6 3 
      All packet attributes are assigned in the master packet flow table. 
 In the above example, there are two sources of flow, nodes N1 and N2, and one 
target, node N6. The algorithm will place two packets, P1 and P2, in the network on 
round 1 at node N1. These packets are sizes 1 and 2, respectively. The algorithm will add 
one packet to the network in each rounds 2 and 3. P3 will be added at node N2 and packet 
P4 will be added at node N1. Once the flow has been added to the network, it is no longer 
directly influenced by the master schedule. Lastly, the algorithm assigns both the 
interdictor and smuggler their round-to-round budgets in Step 1.  
b.  (Interdictor) Estimate Node Supplies (Algorithm 
ESTIMATE_SUPPLIES) 
 The following sub-algorithm calculates the interdictor’s estimated node supplies 
and demands: 
 Algorithm ESTIMATE_SUPPLIES 
(1) Solve Balance of Flow Equation for Supply 
Sets and Indices 
 i N   node (alias j, nodes) 
 ( , )i j A  arc directed from node i to node j 
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 t T   game round in ordered set of total rounds, T. Under control of  
   algorithm I-I/S 
  Data [units] 
 
( , ),t 1i jflow    flow detected in previous round on arc (i, j) [flow/round] 
 Formulation 
 
, , , 1 , , 1
( , ) ( , )
i t i j t j i t
i j A i j A
supply flow flow 
 
        (1.1) 
(2) If Sensor Emplaced on Arc, Update Network Supply Estimates 
  For node i in reverse adjacency list of node with sensor in forward star (FS) 
   
, , 1max( ) |i t j tsupply supply j N j adj i     (1.2)  
(3) Remove Old Supply Estimate. 
  For node ( )i G N  
   If ∃ sensor in iFS   ∄ sensor in Reverse Stari (RSi) Then 
    
, 0i tsupply         (1.3) 
 Discussion 
The algorithm calculates the interdictor’s estimate of each node’s supplies and 
demands from the total materiel sensed along each arc in the previous round (1.1). This is 
a simple balance of flow equation where the left hand side, 
,i tsupply , is the only 
unknown. Using these supplies and demands, the algorithm now extrapolates the 
interdictor’s estimate to potential “upstream” flow origins. In the I-I/S model, we assume 
that the interdictor is aware of arcs in the reverse star of any node with a sensor in the 
forward star (1.2) (Figure 27).  
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Figure 27. Arcs Visible to the Interdictor.  
A sensor placed on arc (N5, N6) makes the interdictor aware of the arcs in the reverse star 
of node N5, arcs (N1, N5) and (N2, N5). The interdictor is unaware of the remaining arcs. 
Lastly, the algorithm reconciles the interdictor’s new estimates of supplies and 
demands to avoid duplication of these supplies and demands among neighbors (1.3). 
Figure 28 illustrates algorithm ESTIMATE_SUPPLIES by example. 
Figure 28. Example of Algorithm ESTIMATE_SUPPLIES. 
 
Algorithm ESTIMATE_SUPPLIES proceeds left to right. Values that change are 
highlighted in red italics. Step a: At left, the algorithm calculates node N5 and N6 
supplies as 2 and -2 based on 2 units of flow being observed on arc (N5, N6). Step b: 
Center, the algorithm uses this estimate to extrapolate supplies at nodes N1 and N2. Step 
c: Right, the algorithm reconciles all node supplies, setting node N5 supply to 0.   
Sensor 
Arc: Interdictor Unaware 




Arc: Interdictor Aware 























[  ] Node supply (  ) Detected flow Sensor 
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2. (Interdictor) Place Sensors 
In Step 2, the interdictor places both overt and then covert sensors subject to a 
sensor budget. 
a.  (Interdictor) Set Covert Sensors Subject to Budget 
The interdictor places covert sensors optimally, given his available partial 
information, by solving a minimum cost flow interdiction problem as below. The 
minimum cost flow interdiction sub-problem places sensors upon arcs instead of 
performing attacks against them as in traditional minimum cost flow interdiction 
formulations. Solving the SENSOR_PLACEMENT Dual Integer-Linear Program (ILP) 
yields the sensor placement plan with the maximum estimated minimum-cost of flow. 
The master I-I/S algorithm controls round indices, t T .  
 Sets and Indices 
  i N    node (alias j, nodes) 
  ( , )i j A   arc directed from node i to node j 
 t T    game round in ordered set of total rounds, T. Under control  
    of algorithm I-I/S 




i j tc  interdictor’s estimate of smuggler’s cost to move packet of  




i j tu  interdictor’s estimate of smuggler’s capacity on arc ( , )i j   




i tb  interdictor’s estimate of supply at node i, >0 supply at node 
  i, <0 demand at node i, = 0 transshipment [flow/round] 
  penalty penalty for flow across arc (i, BFN)  or (BFN, j) | ,i j N   
  covert.budgett maximum number of covert sensors the interdictor can  
  place in round t [cardinality/round] 
  
( , ),i j tq  penalty for traversing an arc with sensor [cost/flow-round] 
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  Decision Variables [units] 
  
( , ),i j tX  flow from node i to node j in round t [flow/round] 
  
( , ),i BFN tA  flow from node i to “Big Fake Node”  (BFN) in round t  
  [flow/round] 
  
( , ),BFN j tE  flow from “Big Fake Node” to node j in round t   
  [flow/round] 
  
, ,. i j tCovert Sensor  =1 if place sensor on arc ( , )i j A  during round t, = 0  
  otherwise [binary] 
 Maximin Formulation to increase arc flow costs [Dual Variables]    
 , , , , , , , , , , , ,
( , )
, , , , , , , , , ,
( , ) ( , )
, , , , ,
, ,
ˆmin . ( )
ˆ. . [ ]max
ˆ0 ( , ) [ ]
,
i j t i j t i j t i j t i BFN t BFN i t
i j A
i N
i j t j i t i BFN t BFN i t i t i t
i j A j i AY
i j t i j t i t
i BFN t B
c q Covert Sensor X penalty E A
s t X X E A b i N
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     
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 
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  SENSOR_PLACEMENT Dual ILP Formulation [Primal Variables] 
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We base the interdictor’s maximin formulation on the interdictor’s estimated 
supplies and demands, 
,
ˆ
i tb , costs, , ,iˆ j tc , and capacities, , ,ˆi j tu (1.4). Using these estimated 
parameters, the interdictor places covert sensors to maximally penalize various potential 
interdictor flows subject to a budget (1.5). Examining the dual formulation reveals an ILP 
that is more easily solved optimally. We leverage elastic programming through variables 
,i BFNE  and ,BFN iA . Each represents flow through an artificial sink node, BFN. The cost of 
this flow along arcs ( , ) |BFN i i N is tn C , where n is the order of the network and Ct 
the maximum of all arc costs during round t. This bounds the dual variables ensuring 
feasibility within the primal problem. The master I-I/S algorithm utilizes the resultant 
solution. 
b. (Interdictor) Set Overt Sensors Subject to Budget 
The interdictor reduces the penalty on arcs with covert sensors set from Step 2.a 
(above) to zero. This prevents the interdictor from selecting the same arc for both covert 
and overt sensors. The interdictor then finds overt sensor locations by solving another 
minimum cost flow interdiction problem with updated arc penalties.  
 
 Algorithm SET_OVERT_SENSORS 
  For ( , )i j A  
        If 
, ,. 1i j tCovert Sensor   Then 
              
( , ) 0i jq   
  . .t tcovert budget overt budget  
  Solve SENSOR_PLACEMENT Dual ILP 
 
 Discussion 
The SENSOR_PLACEMENT Dual ILP formulation is the same, except, 
,. i tCovert Sensor  is replaced by ,. i tOvert Sensor  in (1.4), (1.5), (1.7), (1.8), and (1.10); and 
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,. i tcovert budget  is replaced by ,. i tovert budget  in (1.8). As in Step 2.a of the I-I/S master 
algorithm above, these binary variables indicate the placement of overt sensors on arc (i, 
j) in round t if , ,. i j tOvert Sensor = 1. Similarly, the parameter ,. i tovert budget  limits the 
number of available overt sensors in round t. 
3. (Smuggler) Estimate Network Attributes 
A modified depth-first search (DFS) algorithm computes all simple paths from 
each current packet location to the packet’s assigned target node. The master I-I/S 
algorithm uses the resultant path as an input to Step 4. Next, the smuggler increases his 
arc cost estimates for those arcs with overt sensors placed upon them. Covert sensors are 
not visible to the smuggler so the smuggler does not adjust his estimated arc costs in this 
case. 
a. (Smuggler) For each Packet in Play, Compute all Simple Paths to the 
Target Node 
 Data [units] 
 , ,p i tlocation  =1 if packet p located at node i during round t, = 0 otherwise  
   [binary] 
 Algorithm PACKET_PATHS 
  For p Packets  
   ,| ( 1)p ik i location   
   list ={ }; paths = { } 
   SimplePaths (i, target, list, paths) 
    list = list  i 
    If i == “target” Then 
     paths = paths   list 
    Else 
     For j adjacent to i and  paths 
       Call SimplePaths (j, target, list, paths) 
   list = list \ { i }  
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b.  Increase Smuggler Arc Costs. 
 For ( , )i j A  
  If ,. 1i tOvert Sensor  Then 
   ( , ), ( , ), 1 ( , )i j t i j t i jc c q         (1.12) 
 Discussion 
The simple recursive algorithm above continues a DFS from the packet’s current 
location, node i, through each node j adjacent to node i until reaching the target. Next, the 
algorithm examines candidate paths and retains them if they are unique and lead to the 
target, discarding all other paths. The remaining data container paths enumerate the set of 
simple paths. The PACKET_PATHS algorithm begins by increasing the smuggler’s cost 
over arcs upon which the interdictor has placed an overt sensor (1.12). This provides 
awareness of these emplacements to the smuggler. 
4. (Smuggler) Move Packets  
Next, the smuggler moves packets optimally in the network given his incomplete 
information. The smuggler determines these movements by solving the following 
optimization problem. Note that within the objective function, material moved to the 




 Sets and Indices 
 i N   node (alias j, nodes) 
 ( , )i j A   arc directed from node i to node j 
 p Packets   packet 
 ,( , ), .p i j t tshort Short paths  arc in simple path for packet p from current location 
  to target 
 ( , )i targettouchdown A   arc in reverse star of target node 
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t T     game round in ordered set of total rounds, T. Under  
    control of algorithm I-I/S 
 Data [units] 
 psize   size of packet p [flow] 
 , ,p i tlocation   =1 if packet p located at node i during round t, = 0  
  otherwise [binary] 
 ( , ),i j tc   smuggler’s cost to move packet of size 1 across arc  
  ( , )i j  during round t [cost/flow-round] 
 ( , ),i j tu   smuggler’s capacity on arc ( , )i j during round t   
  [flow/round] 
 tbudget   smuggler’s movement budget during round t 
 Decision Variables [units] 
 ,( , ),p i j tMove   =1 if move packet p on arc (i, j), =0 otherwise  
  [binary] 
 PACKET_MOVES Formulation
,( , ), ( , ),
,( , )| ,( , ) .
,( , ), |( , )
min [ (1 )
]
p p i j t i j t
Move
p i j p i j Short paths








     (1.13)
,( , ), , , , ,. . 0 , ( , )p i j t p i t p i ts t Move location p i j location      (1.14) 
,( , ), ,( , ), ,( , ),
|( , )
0; , ,p j nodes t p i j t p i j t
nodes j nodes A
Move Move p i j short

       (1.15) 
,( , ), ( , ),
,( , )|( , )
p p i j t i j t t
p i j i j A
size Move c budget

         (1.16) 
,( , ), ( , ), ( , )p p i j t i j t
p
size Move u i j A        (1.17) 
,( , ), 1 ,p i j t
j




The first term of the objective function, ,( , ), ( , ),(1 )p p i j t i j tsize Move c   ,  calculates 
the smuggler’s “work remaining” for each packet to reach its target (1.13). By summing 
over the all packets along the allowable paths, the cumulative work remaining is 
calculated. The second term, ,( , ), |( , )t p i j t i j touchdown pbudget Move size   , provides extra 
reward for the interdictor moving any packets fully to their assigned target. Binary 
decision variables with value 1, ,( , ),p i j tMove = 1, reduce the amount of total remaining 
work and achieve the additional incentive of moving a packet to its target. 
The first constraint ensures each packet begins movement from its present 
location (1.14). The second constraint mandates packet movement across consecutive 
arcs (1.15). Next, total packet movements are restricted by the smuggler’s movement 
budget (1.16) and each arc’s capacity (1.17). The last constraint prevents packets from 
taking multiple paths within any solution (1.18). 
As illustrated in the constructive cases, the above formulation does not always 
cause the smuggler to utilize the lowest-cost paths. That is not the smuggler’s objective. 
Several budget feasible paths yielding the same work remaining will all lie within the 
smuggler’s indifference threshold. The smuggler is equally likely to choose any of these 
paths, creating path diversity in some instances. Path diversity within multicriteria 
decision-making problems well-aligns with the author’s experience in tactical situations. 
5. (Combat) Arbitrate Detections and Attacks 
In Step 5, the I-I/S algorithm arbitrates any interactions between the smuggler’s 
packets and the interdictor’s sensors. 
a. For those Packets that Moved Across a Sensor, Arbitrate Detections 
First, the interdictor updates his current estimated cost for each arc ( , )i j A . 
Then, for each packet, the algorithm evaluates the path assigned from Step 4 and sensor 
placements from Step 2. If there is a sensor on the path, the algorithm draws an outcome 
from the unique distribution describing the probability of detection for the packet on the 
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arc. A Tausworthe generator sets pseudo-random seeds (Tausworthe 1965). Begun with 
the aforementioned seeds, the algorithm draws pseudo-random variates from a Uniform 
distribution using a Mersenne Twister algorithm (Matsumoto 1998). 
(1) Arbitrate Detections 
  ( , ),ˆ i j tc :    interdictor’s estimate of arc ( , )i j  cost during round t  
     [cost/flow-round] 
  ( , ),i j tdetections :  total amount of material detected on arc ( , )i j  during round 
     t [non-negative integer] 
  packet.signature: level of stealth for packets [non-negative integer] 
   ~ [0,1]x Uniform  
   ,p tsize :   size of packet p during round t [positive integer] 
   
  For packet p in current packets 
       For arc ( , )i j  in simple path assigned to packet p 
           If ( , ), 1i j tSensor   Then 
      If x   
 ( , ), ,ˆ0.1 .
,( , ),
i j t p tc packet signature sizedetect
p i j tP e
  
  Then   (1.19) 
           Packet p is detected on arc ( , )i j  in round t 
(2) Tally Game Round Detections 
  For ( , )i j A   
       
( , ),
( , ),
| . i j t
i j t p
p p detected packets
detections size

        (1.20) 
 Discussion 
The distribution describing the interdictor’s probability of detection is a function 
of several variables. Equation (1.19) shows the probability of detecting a particular 
packet p in a specific round t on arc (i, j). As above, this probability is individually 
computed for each packet that is a candidate for detection (Figure 21). As described in 
Section A, different packets can have different sizes, but the size of each packet is fixed. 
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The parameter,  thus allows the probability of detection to increase with increasing 
packet size. The parameter, packet.signature can further magnify the effect of size on the 
probability of detection. The magnification is important to isolate the influence that the 
ease of packet detectability plays in the interdictor-smuggler problem. The interdictor’s 
estimate of arc (i, j) cost, ( , ),ˆ i j tc , changes round-to-round as a result of the number of 
previous detections. We detail the method of estimating cost change in Step 6. We 
mandate that ( , ),ˆ. p i j tpacket signature size c   in equation (1.19) to ensure ,( , ), 1
detect
p i j tP  . 
Figure 29. Sample Probabilities of Detection. 
 
 
The plot above displays sample probabilities of detection for packets size 1, 3, and 5 by 
interdictor cost estimates. As size increases, the probability of detection increases. As 




b. (Interdictor) Attack and Remove Detected Packets 
The interdictor “attacks” all detected packets. These attacks destroy the material 
within the packet, removing it from the game. Both the interdictor and smuggler tally the 
attacked materiel, affecting each of their estimated network information in Step 6. 
Attacks occur free of budget and are always successful. 
 For packet p 
      If packet p has been detected Then 
           Remove packet p from network 
c. Tally Packets that Reach the Target Node and Remove Them from the 
Network 
The algorithm removes packets from the network that have reached the target 
without destruction in the current round. The sum of these packet sizes, the total materiel, 
is the round’s score. This ground truth score is available only to the smuggler. Feedback 









   [flow/round]      (1.21) 
6.  (Smuggler/Interdictor) Adjust Prediction Mechanisms by Feedback 
The interdictor and smuggler update their private network information based on 
the results of play. First, the interdictor performs one final estimation of flow leaving the 
game through the target. Reconciliation of the remaining estimated network flow 
prevents a “death spiral” where the interdictor places fewer sensors by round and thus 
detects less flow by round until the flow estimate is zero and no sensors are placed. This 
occurs in spite of the actual non-zero flow reaching the target. Next, the smuggler’s 
estimates of cost and capacity are influenced by both materiel lost and materiel 
successfully moved. Finally, the interdictor adjusts his estimated arc costs and capacities, 
completing the game round. 
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a. Calculate Interdictor’s Estimate of Hits
.p detected Packets : set of packets detected when reaching target 
and exiting the network in round t  
[cardinality] 
. ttotal hits : interdictor’s estimate of material  
successfully reaching target in round t  
[flow/round].   . . ttotal hits total flow
~ [0,1]x Uniform  
For packet p: 
If , ,p i tlocation target  Then 




p target tP e
 
   Then   (1.22) 
Packet p is detected on exiting game through target 






p detected location target
total hits size

    (1.23) 
Discussion 
Equation (1.22) expresses the interdictor’s probability of detecting packets that 
successfully hit the target and exit the game. As with the sensors’ probability of detection, 
the probability of detection upon exit is a function of the packet’s size; however, there is 
no direct effect of the detection history in this case (Figure 30). The uncertainty is 
necessary to mirror realistic smuggling scenarios. In this context an interdictor rarely has 
perfect information about the smuggler at any point—even at scenario’s conclusion. 
Additionally, it treats situations where the interdictor is part of a layered defense and 
provided an estimate of materiel flow from the next line of defense. It requires the 
interdictor to learn and adapt under uncertainty, also facilitating miscalculation. These are 
important model facets to maintain realism.  
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Figure 30. Interdictor’s Probability of Detecting a Packet Reaching the 
Target. 
The plot represents only the probability of detecting packets that have otherwise eluded 
detection by sensors and exited the game by reaching the target. Packet sizes are integral, 
so the probability is a discrete random variable.  
b. Calculate Interdictor’s Estimate of Flow on ( , ) targeti j RS
( , ),i j tflow : amount of material detected by a sensor on arc (i, j) during 
round t [flow/round] 
( , ),i j tdestroyed : total amount of material successfully destroyed on (i, j) by 
attack during round t  [flow/round]
         For " "( , ) basei j RS
( , ),( , ), ( , ),
( , ) ( , )
.
target
t i j ti j t k j t
i j A k j RS k i
flow total hits destroyed flow
   
     (1.24) 
Discussion 
In (1.24), the interdictor forms an estimate of flow on each arc within the RS of 
the target. This estimate is based on the estimate of materiel exiting through the target in 








and the total detected materiel on the arc (i, j) in round t, 
( , ),
( , ) target
k j t




Uncertain of the actual path of undetected packets that have struck the target, the 
interdictor conservatively estimates that these packets travelled along every arc within the
targetRS . This allows the interdictor to place sensors more reactively in the next round and 
mirrors realistic tactical decisions. Figure 31 provides an illustrative example of step 5.b. 
Figure 31. Interdictor’s Estimate of Flow Reaching the Target. 
The observed flow on arc (N5, N6) is 3. The amount of destroyed flow on this arc is also 
3. All other flows on the arcs in the RS of N6, the target, are 0. Each flow estimate is then
updated by adding the amount of material striking the target and subtracting the amount 
of material destroyed on that arc. Values that change are highlighted in red italics. 
Sensor 
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(  ) Detected flow 
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c. Update Interdictor’s Estimate of Arc Capacity and Cost Based on
Detected Flow 
 : scaling parameter (0.0 – 1.0) that attenuates the interdictor’s 
capacity estimate from the previous round, ( , ), 1ˆ i j tu  .
For ( , )i j A  
 ( , ), ( , ), 1 ( , ),ˆ ˆmax , ,1i j t i j t i j tu u detections       (1.25) 
 ( , ), ( , ), 1 ( , ), ( , ), 0ˆ ˆ ˆmin max 1, 1 ,i j t i j t i j t i j tc c detections c         (1.26) 
If ( , ), ( , ),ˆ ˆi j t i j tu flow  Then   (1.27) 
( , ), ( , ),
ˆ ˆ
i j t i j tu flow
Discussion 
In Step 6.c., the interdictor learns, refining his estimate of arc capacities by 
utilizing the maximum of the amount of observed flow in round t, ( , ),i j tdetections , a 
scaled estimate of capacity from the previous round, ( , ), 1ˆ i j tu  , and 1 (1.25). We apply 
the mathematical floor function to ensure this value remains an integer. The actual arc 
capacity must be at least the observed flow in round t. However, the interdictor reasons 
that detections might have been low or the smuggler could have utilized an alternative 
path. The interdictor retains some memory by considering the previous round’s capacity, 
scaled by a factor,  , between 0.0 and 1.0. Lastly, the interdictor always assumes each 
arc under consideration has capacity of at least 1. Even so, if the capacity estimate on arcs 
within targetRS is less than the flow estimated in Step 6.b (1.24), the interdictor  
conservatively increases the capacity estimate to the flow estimate (1.25). 
By similar feedback, the interdictor updates arc cost estimates (1.26). The 
interdictor subtracts the number of detections in round t, ( , ),i j tdetections , from  his cost 
estimate in the previous round, ( , ), 1ˆ i j tc  . As with similar estimates, the interdictor adds 1 
to the estimated arc cost so that decreasing detections on a particular arc cause the 
interdictor to look elsewhere for smuggled flow. Lastly, the interdictor places a lower 
bound on his current estimate of 1 and an upper bound equal to his initial round 0 
estimate. This guarantees that the estimate of cost will become neither 0 nor excessively 
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large if the interdictor plays multiple rounds with a great many or no detections, 
respectively. 
d. Update Smuggler’s Arc Capacity and Cost Based on Game Round
Results 
        attenuate: rate of cost attenuation [{ | (0,1]}attenuate attenuate  ] 
        For ( , )i j A   
 ( , ), ( , ), 1 ( , ),. 0.5i j t i j t i j tc attenuate c loss multiple destroyed         (1.28) 
Discussion 
Equation (1.28) instantiates a feedback loop that facilitates smuggler learning and 
resource loss. The smuggler adds the amount of material destroyed on an arc to the cost 
under the assumption that the loss of a packet increases the expense or risk of moving 
additional packets on the same arc. A loss.multiple magnifies this degradation to facilitate 
the exploration of various scenarios. The remaining elements of equation (1.28) 
instantiate the transformation function. We described them in the next section. 
7. (Environment) Transformation Function
The transformation function first reduces the smuggler’s arc cost by a constant 
factor, attenuate, and then rounds down to the nearest integer (1.28). For example, setting 
attenuate to 0.9 would reduce the cost on each arc ( , )i j  by 10 percent before further 
rounding. The reduction in cost provides for repair of the network capability or “calming 
of risk” after the shock of a seizure by the interdictor. The reduction in cost also provides 
a mechanism to increase smuggler efficiency through time in accordance with traditional 
learning theory (e.g., Cesa-Bianchi et al. 2006). 
E. DISCUSSION OF I-I/S MODEL FORMULATION 
The preceding I-I/S mathematical model formulation displays both the family of 
realistic features and suite of complimentary stochastic and optimization models we bring 
to bear in order to study the interdictor-smuggler problem. Our modelling assumptions—
asymmetric, incomplete information between two players receiving limited feedback over 
multiple rounds of play—would make finding optimal solutions computationally 
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prohibitive if not entirely intractable for even many of the most modern models reviewed 
within Chapter 2 of this thesis. However, by rigorously blending a number of well-
established analytic tools within our simulation algorithm, we provide a tractable 
heuristic to explore a rich, complex problem under limited assumptions.  
In the next chapter, we continue the exploration by applying the I-I/S simulation 
algorithm to realistically configured test cases. 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we present the results from two interdictor-smuggler problem 
instances. The first instance portrays a smuggling network with a large number of 
possible parallel routes, the second a network with fewer alternative paths but significant 
depth. Our goal is to assess the performance of various interdictor resource allocation 
policies and illustrate the types of insights that our model can provide. 
A. COMPUTATIONAL CASES 
1. Implementation Details
We code the I-I/S algorithm in a combination of Python 2.7 (Van Rossum 2007) 
and GAMS 24.4.1 (GAMS Development Corporation 2013). Within Python 2.7, we 
utilize the NetworkX package (Hagberg et al. 2008). We use GAMS with CPLEX 
12.6.1.0 to solve the SENSOR_PLACEMENT Dual Integer-Linear Program (ILP) and 
MOVE_PACKETS ILP formulated in Chapter 3. Sanchez’s NOLHdesigns spreadsheet 
was used to construct the two Orthogonal Latin Hypercube designs of experiments 
(Sanchez 2015). We perform all experiments on a Windows PC with 2.6 GHz CPU and 8 
GB RAM. Lastly, we use a combination of R 3.3.0 (R Core Team 2016) and JMP Pro 
12.0.1 (JMP Pro 2015) to construct the statistical models herein.   
2. Case 1
Case 1 involves a smuggling network over 27 arcs and 16 nodes (Figure 32). The 
designed network provides 25 paths from the smuggler’s source of materiel, node HB 
(Hostile Base), to the intended target, node N13. We place arc (N13, N15) within the 
network to deliberately explore instances of miscalculation by the interdictor. As it is not 
possible for the smuggler to ever move materiel across arc (N13, N15), the interdictor 
would be wrong to place sensors there. Table 4 displays the initial network data. The 
smuggler’s estimates of arc capacities begin as set uniformly to 10 units in order to 
reduce the confounding of dynamic cost and capacity effects under analysis. At the 
initiation of the game, the interdictor considers each route as equally likely. Therefore, 
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similar to the smuggler’s estimates of arc capacity, the interdictor’s estimates of arc costs 
and capacities are originally uniform. We then design the network topology and initial 
smuggler cost estimates to create a realistic range of total route costs and facilitate the 
introduction of new routes over successive game rounds.  
Figure 32. Case 1 Designed Network. 
There are 25 s-t paths in the above network. Initial smuggler estimates of arc cost are 
indicated in parenthesis. Smuggler arc capacity estimates are uniformly 10. 
We consider a time horizon of 20 game rounds for all scenarios in Case 1. 
Prototype simulation runs within the Case 1 problem instances demonstrated that within 
20 game rounds we observe several cycles of adaptive play without incurring excessive 
computational expense. Dynamic topology motivates both the smuggler and interdictor to 
adapt. In Case 1, all arcs with cost above 8 units are initially invisible to the smuggler. 
The selected value, 8, allows the transformation function to reveal 15 new arcs to the 
smuggler within the 20 game rounds. These new arcs progressively introduce 11 of the 
25 total paths throughout each 20-round game (Figure 33). Given our selected network 
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data, we find that both the smuggler and interdictor will adjust to a new path within 
approximately three to four rounds of play. 
Table 4. Initial Interdictor and Smuggler Estimates. 
The Case 1 initial network data. In order to reduce the confounding of dynamic cost and 
capacity effects under analysis, the smuggler’s estimates of arc capacities begin as set 
uniformly to 10 units. The interdictor considers each route as equally likely at the 
initiation of the game. Therefore, similar to the smuggler’s estimates of arc capacity, the 
interdictor’s estimates of arc costs and capacities are originally uniform. We then design 
the network topology and initial smuggler cost estimates to create a realistic range of total 
route costs and facilitate the introduction of new routes over successive game rounds. 
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Figure 33. Initial Arcs Visible to the Smuggler and Interdictor 
Left: Arcs visible to the smuggler in round 1 (heavy blue). The remaining arcs are 
revealed by the transformation functions action as a timer. Right: Arcs visible to the 
interdictor in round 1 (dashed green). Only arcs adjacent to the interdictor’s placed 
sensors are visible. The interdictor remembers all arcs seen in previous rounds. In Case 1, 
we observe the two subgraphs seldom match.  
The smuggler’s budget, 350 cost/round, is just adequate to allow the smuggler to 
transport any materiel introduced at node HB in a single round through the network 
within the two following rounds. Requiring a minimum of two rounds to traverse the 
network allows us to investigate interdiction decisions that must consider both time and 
space. Larger budgets that provide sufficient resources for the smuggler to move flow 
across the entire network within only one round create a problem only in space, not time, 
for the interdictor. Without interdiction in the Case 1 network, the maximum flow per 
round is limited by budget, not arc capacity. The smuggler could transport 20 units of 
flow through the entire network within one round, given a sufficiently large movement 
budget. Therefore, representing a situation where the smuggler’s budget is just sufficient 
to accomplish his immediate aim of moving a packet from source to target in two rounds 
also allows a more transparent quantification of the impact of the interdictor’s resource 
allocation decisions.  
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In Case 1, the master scheduling table introduces 240 total units of materiel at 
node HB across the 20 rounds. The materiel is divided into packets either uniformly-sized 
at size 1, 2 or 3 or randomly-sized between 1 and 3 units. A Mersenne Twister algorithm 
generated the sequence of pseudo-random packet sizes (Matsumoto 1998). We partition 
the resultant sequence of packet sizes into 20 groups so that each partition includes 
approximately 12 units of flow (Table 5). There are approximately 12 units of flow in 
each round whether the packets are all 1, 2, 3, or randomly-sized. The smuggler’s supply 
is thus consistent in each round.    
Table 5. Example of Master Packet Schedule. 
In some scenarios, packet sizes are randomly drawn between one and three using the 
Mersenne Twister algorithm. The sequence of random packet sizes is partitioned to 
introduce approximately 12 units of flow to each round. However, the table continues to 
round 20; only rounds 1–3 are displayed in the above example. 
a. Design of Experiments
We combine an Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (OLH), crossed design, and star 
points to consider 71 equally likely scenarios in Case 1. These scenarios program two 
decision variables and five noise variables through a realistic range of values (Table 6).  
68 
Table 6. Case 1 Range of Factors in Experimental Design. 
Decision Variables Definition from Chapter 3 Range of values 
covert.budgett maximum number of covert sensors the interdictor can 
place in round t [cardinality/round] 
[0, Sensor Budget] 
overt.budgett maximum number of overt sensors the interdictor can 
place in round t [cardinality/round] 
[0, Sensor Budget] 
Noise Factors Definition from Chapter 3 Range of values 
( , ),i j tq




size of packet p [flow] [1, 2, 3, random 
integer [1,3]] 
packet.signature level of stealth for packets [non-negative integer] [1, 2, 3] 
  scaling parameter (0.0 – 1.0) that attenuates the 
interdictor’s capacity estimate from the previous round, 
( , ), 1
ˆ
i j tu 
[0.6, 1.0] 
attenuate rate of cost attenuation 
[{ | (0,1]}attenuate attenuate  ] 
[0.88, 0.95] 
The decision variables represent choices the interdictor makes to allocate his 
sensor budget between covert and overt sensors, grossly described by three general 
policies: pure overt, pure covert, and hybrid policy. Under pure overt and pure covert 
policies, the interdictor devotes the entire sensor budget to overt or covert sensors, 
respectively. The hybrid policy includes each possible combination of overt and covert 
sensor allocation within the overall sensor budget. For example, hybrid policies within 
sensor budget 3 include both (a) 1 overt and 2 covert sensors, and (b) 2 overt and 1 covert 
sensors. The range of values assumed by the noise variables in Table 6 acts as a surrogate 
for different levels of smuggler and interdictor technological sophistication and tactical 
acumen. We use a two-stage statistical sampling procedure as developed by Dudewicz 
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and Dalal (1975) to determine the number of required replications. Under the procedure, 
we repeat each scenario a minimum of 10 times to establish at least a 90 percent 
confidence level that the error in an estimate of the expected value of smuggled flow is 
less than 10 percent. 
b. Results
(1) Interdictor Policy Performance: Aggregate Metrics
We consider any smuggled flow reaching the target as loss. Figure 34 shows the 
total smuggled flow (loss) versus the interdictor’s sensor budget. The plot clearly shows a 
face-valid trend: with additional sensors, the interdictor can cause greater disruption to 
smuggler routes, reducing smuggler flow. We seek to understand this relationship in 
more detail. (For further information on robust design and loss functions see Kleijnen et 
al. [2005], Sanchez [2000].)  
Figure 34. Total Smuggled Flow versus Interdictor Sensor Budget. 
The total smuggled flow per game decreases as the interdictor’s sensor budget increases. 
The lack of data at sensor budgets 6, 9 and 10 is an artifact of the OLH design. Because 
the results from each policy show unequal variance, we use a loss function to calculate 
the total smuggled flow and then compare policy performance. 
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Within the range of scenarios described in Case 1, we further focus our 
investigation on instances where the interdictor has a sensor budget between two and 
five. Given a budget of six or more sensors, the interdictor can proceed with a naïve 
strategy, placing sensors along a majority of the always-visible s-t cut across the reverse 
star of node N13 (Figure 35). Such a strategy requires neither estimation nor adaptation 
from the interdictor to execute successfully. Within our model, the smuggler’s private 
and incomplete information provides a subtle nuance for the interdictor’s strategic 
decisions. Given that the smuggler plays on a subset of the available arcs that changes in 
time, the minimum s-t cut of the subgraph created by these arcs also changes in time. 
Restricting the interdictor to less than six sensors thus allows us to investigate problem 
instances where there is no obvious sensor allocation strategy that is robust to an adapting 
and malicious smuggler.  
Figure 35. A Naïve s-t Cut in Case 1. 
Six sensors are sufficient to make an s-t cut (dashed red) with no exploration from the 
interdictor. Because they are part of the target’s reverse star, these arcs are always visible 
to the interdictor. We limit our further investigations to interdictor sensor budgets below 
six to examine the value of less obvious interdictor strategies.  
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We supplement our original OLH design with 53 new design points. Using an 
augmented crossed design, the experiments consider the same range of noise factors for 
sensor budgets restricted between two and five, inclusive (Table 7). The additional 53 
design points create a much higher degree of space filling and allow verification of the 
statistical model predictions we generate using the original OLH design. Because the 
variance of each studied instance is unequal and variance is generally undesirable in 
tactical situations, we use a loss function to compare policy effectiveness. Figure 36 
displays the loss by policy. Figure 37 displays the percentage of flow degradation by 
policy for each sensor budget. 
Table 7. Case 1 Range of Factors in Crossed Design with Star Points. 
Decision Variables Range of values 
covert.budgett [2, 5] | covert.budgett + overt.budgett = [2,5] 
overt.budgett [2, 5] | covert.budgett + overt.budgett = [2,5] 
Noise Factors Range of values 
( , ),i j tq
[20, 40] 
psize
random integer [1,3] 
packet.signature [1, 3] 
The interdictor desires to minimize the smuggled flow. Given two or three 
sensors, allocating them all as overt sensors, a pure overt policy, minimizes flow. These 
policies are 8 percent and 3 percent better than the hybrid policies with one covert sensor, 
the next best performing policies (Table 8). However, as the sensor budget increases to 
four and five, the hybrid policy becomes more effective and eventually superior to the 
pure overt policy (Figure 36, Table 8).  
We apply 10 additional design points across each sensor budget. The added 
design points allow finer resolution of the near equal loss resultant from several policies. 
We note that at sensor budget four, the hybrid policy and pure overt policy with one 
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covert sensor produce almost the same degradation of flow, 49 and 50 percent, 
respectively (Table 8). However, when we consider total materiel destroyed, there is a 
significant difference in policy performance (Figure 37). At sensor budget five, the 
amount of seized materiel is also significantly different between the two policies with 
maximum degradation of smuggled flow, hybrid (3 covert) and hybrid (4 covert). 
Figure 36. Contour Profile of Loss versus Number of Overt and 
Number of Covert Sensors. 
The graphic shows loss contours projected from our statistical model (Appendix A). The 
contours indicate pure overt sensor policies produce the minimum loss for sensor budgets 
equal to two or three. However, the hybrid policy is a superior allocation of either four or 
five total sensors. 
Table 8. Policy Performance: Percentage of Degradation of Smuggler Flow. 
At sensor budgets equal to two and three, pure overt policies maximally degrade the 
smuggler’s flow. However, hybrid policies become more effective at with a budget of 
four sensors, and clearly superior with five total sensors available. 
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Figure 37. Policy Performance by Sensor Budget. 
(a) With a sensor budget equal to two, the pure overt strategy maximally degrades the 
smuggled flow. It offers 8% more degradation than the hybrid policy. 
Figure 37. Policy Performance by Sensor Budget (Cont.). 
(b) The pure overt policy still offers maximum degradation of smuggled flow with three 
sensors available. The degradation is 3% greater than the hybrid (1 covert) policy. 
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Figure 37. Policy Performance by Sensor Budget (Cont.). 
(c) While the pure overt and hybrid (1 covert) policy showed the almost the same 
degradation of smuggled flow, 49%, there is significant difference in the percentage of 
total materiel destroyed. The hybrid (1 covert) policy destroys over 6% more flow (darker 
in blue). 
Figure 37. Policy Performance by Sensor Budget (Cont.). 
(d) The hybrid (3 covert) policy maximally degrades the smuggler’s flow, given five 
available sensors. Under the hybrid policy, the degradation is 2% greater than the next 
highest option, a hybrid (4 covert) policy. Even so, the amount of materiel destroyed 
increases by 10% when the interdictor follows a hybrid (4 covert) policy. 
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Within the detail provided by the expanded experimental design, we also note a 
significant improvement in flow degradation as sensor sensitivity improves. Figure 38 
shows the effect on the percent of smuggled flow degraded versus the number of covert 
sensors as sensor probability of detection increases by approximately 8 percent. An 8 
percent change encompasses the full range we examine in our experimental design. The 
improved degradation of flow was consistent across all Case 1 policies. As the number of 
covert sensors increase, the improvement ranged from approximately 7 percent to 24 
percent degradation of flow. Even so, the improvement did not significantly change until 
the interdictor employed more than two covert sensors. 
Figure 38. Effect of Sensor Sensitivity on the Percent Degradation of 
Smuggled Materiel. 
Improving each sensor’s probability of detection by approximately 8% yields consistent 
improvement in all Case 1 scenarios. Left: Boxplots illustrate the general distribution of 
the percent of degradation of smuggled materiel versus the number of covert sensors by 
probability of detection scenario (Baseline Pd or +8% Pd). Right: To ease interpretability 
and comparison, we plot two statistical models (piecewise splines with 0.05  ), one fit 
to the Baseline Pd and one fit to the +8% Pd. The 8% increase to probability of detection 
causes approximately 7% greater degradation of flow with low numbers of covert 
sensors. As the number of covert sensors increases, so does the effect of increased Pd. 
With four covert sensors, there is a 24% increase to smuggler flow degradation when the 
probability of detection is raised approximately 8%. 
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(2) Interdictor Policy Performance: Time Dynamics 
Having considered the aggregate performance of each policy, we turn our 
attention to the detailed time dynamics of game play under each policy. We use the 710 
time series generated from our DOE to construct a meta-game for each policy, 
representing the 0.9 quantile of per-round smuggled flow of all games in the policy. That 
is, only 10 percent of the games had higher per-round smuggled flow than the meta-
game. Figure 40 depicts the family of meta-games within each sensor budget. In that 
figure as a reference, we highlight the policy generating the greatest overall degradation 
to the total smuggled flow, as analyzed in Case 1, Section A.2.b.(1). It is immediately 
apparent that the games are highly dynamic. Round-to-round flow oscillates significantly. 
Further analysis of smuggler packet movement and interdictor sensor placement shows 
the oscillation is a result of the action-counteraction cycle between the interdictor and 
smuggler aggravated by the revelation of new arcs through the countdown timer. We also 
note that certain policies tend to reduce more consistently the maximum per-round 
smuggler flow within a game. We focus on round 8, when by the action of the countdown 
timer, the simulation makes an entirely new smuggling path visible (Figure 39). 
Figure 39. Newly Visible Smuggling Path in Round 8. 
The countdown timer reveals the N2—N5—N8—N11—N13 path in round 8 (dashed red), 
almost an entire s-t path. Arcs (N5, N12), (N12, N11), and (N14, N13) are not yet visible 
(dotted). 
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Figure 40. Meta-Games, the 0.9 Quantile of Smuggled Flow by Game 
Round. 
(a) Sensor Budget 2. The smuggled flow dramatically oscillates round-to-round by 
almost an order of magnitude. No single policy shows significantly different performance 
than the pure overt policy (dashed red). Flow peaks at 20 to 24 units in round 8 when the 
algorithm introduces a new s-t path, but the interdictor rapidly adjusts by round 10 
dropping flow to 4 units. Heavy red dashes indicate the policy maximally degrading the 
total smuggled flow per game in Case 1. 
(b) Sensor Budget 3. As with a budget of two sensors, given three sensors, we observe 
no significant difference between each policy’s round-to-round play. The peak flow in 
round 8 is slightly attenuated, reducing from 20–24 to 20–22. Heavy red dashes indicate 
the policy maximally degrading the total smuggled flow per game in Case 1. 
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(c) Sensor Budget 4. We begin to observe significant differences in policy round-to-
round performance. Of note, the hybrid (2 covet) policy, depicted in green, shows a 10–
20% reduction in the round 8 peak flow. Red dashes indicate the policy maximally 
degrading the total smuggled flow per game in Case 1. 
(d) Sensor Budget 5. There is now a substantial difference in round-to-round policy 
performance. The hybrid (4 covert) policy demonstrates a reduction in round 8 peak 
smuggled flow of over 50 percent. A 20–30% reduction in the peak flow of later rounds 
is also apparent. Red dashes indicate the policy maximally degrading total smuggled flow 
in per game Case 1. 
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As sensor budgets increase, we observe significant differences by policy in peak 
round-to-round smuggled flow. The 0.9 quantile of smuggled flow reduces by up to 50 
percent in round 8 when the interdictor employs a hybrid policy over pure overt policy. 
(3) Evaluation of Seizures as Proxy for Smuggled Flow 
Figure 41 shows the total smuggled flow versus the total amount of materiel 
destroyed over all Case 1 scenarios. A naïve regression indicates a moderately strong 
relationship between the total amount of materiel seized and the total amount of 
smuggled materiel (R2 = 0.605).  
Figure 41. Linear Regression of Total Smuggled Materiel versus Total 
Materiel Detected. 
The best linear model explains only 60 percent of the observed variance in the total 
smuggled materiel. We observed no improved explanatory power under a variety of 
variable transformations. 
However, within the naïve regression, we note an inconsistent level of variability 
indicating heteroscedasticity, bringing doubt on any inference from the regression results 
(Figure 42). Further exploration indicates a significant change in the strength of the 
relationship between seizures and flow when total sensor budget is considered (Figure 
43). With a budget of three sensors, the amount of seized materiel explains only 23 
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percent of the variability in the amount of unseen smuggled materiel. Even so, models 
considering sensor budget still suffer from some inequality of variance at different 
simulation configurations representing the different interdictor policies.  
Figure 42. Residuals for the Naïve Regression Model. 
The plot of residuals indicates unequal variance among estimates. The heteroscedasticity 
makes any inference problematic. 
Figure 43. Total Smuggled Materiel versus Total Materiel Detected. 
The relationship between total materiel detected and total materiel smuggled is 
inconsistent. Left: With a budget of two sensors, the amount of detected materiel explains 
only 50 percent of the variance in the total smuggled flow. Center: With a budget of three 
sensors, the relationship between detected flow and actual total flow is extremely weak. 
Right: The largest R2 occurs with a budget of four sensors, yielding 62 percent of the 
variance explained. The shaded region represents a 95 percent confidence interval. 
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When we also consider individual policies, variance stabilizes, providing a much 
stronger case for accurate inference (Figure 44, Figure 45). 
Figure 44. Model of Total Smuggled Materiel versus Total Materiel 
Detected by Policy with a Budget of Three Sensors.  
The relationship between the total materiel detected and the total smuggled materiel is 
highly inconsistent. For the pure overt policy (blue), the total materiel detected conveys 
no information on the total smuggled flow, R2 = 0.00. The shaded regions represent a 95 
percent confidence interval. 
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Figure 45. Model of Total Smuggled Materiel versus Total Materiel 
Detected by Policy with a Budget of Four Sensors.  
With a budget of four sensors, the relationship between the total materiel detected and the 
total smuggled materiel is again highly inconsistent. It varies from high explanatory 
power for pure covert policy (dashed orange) to very low explanatory power for hybrid (2 
covert) (green). The shaded regions represent a 95 percent confidence interval. 
As shown in Figure 44 and Figure 45, there is wide variation in the power of the 
amount of detected materiel to explain the amount of smuggled flow varies considerably. 
With pure covert policies, the relationship is extremely strong. However, for three 
policies featuring more overt sensors, the amount of detected materiel is weakly related to 
the total smuggled materiel. Generally, these same more overt policies are also the 
policies we found most effective at minimizing the total smuggled materiel.  
(4) The Relationship between Discovered Network and Flow 
In this section, we explore the relationship between the information gained by the 
interdictor through exploration of the smuggling network and the total amount of 
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smuggled flow. First, to quantify the information gained by exploration, we measure the 
percentage of arcs within the smuggling network discovered by the interdictor under each 
sensor allocation policy. Displayed in Figure 46, policies with higher percentages of 
covert sensors tend to discover more of the smuggling network but do not explain a large 
portion of the variance for the network discovered.  
We continue assessing the value of information by now quantifying it by the total 
amount of materiel smuggled. Figure 47 shows the total smuggled materiel versus the 
percentage of all arcs discovered by the interdictor within each of the 47 Case 1 
scenarios. Using a generalized linear model, the percentage of arcs discovered only 
explains 10 percent of the variance in the total amount of materiel smuggled. Further 
investigation by specific interdictor policy also reveals weak relationships between these 
two factors. 
Figure 46. Percent Arcs Discovered versus Percent of Sensor Budget 
Dedicated to Covert Sensors. 
The above data results from measuring with a loss function the percent of total arcs 
discovered. The policies have heterogeneous variance. The loss function allows us to 
compare different policies despite the heterogeneity. Interdictor policies with higher 
percent of covert sensors generally discover more of the smuggler network. Even so, the 
relationship is weak, accounting for just over 40 percent of the variance in the 
nonparametric kernel density smoother using local weights (blue line). We draw attention 
to this face-valid trend to support observations focused on less-obvious emergent 
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relationships in the following sections. (piecewise splines with 0.05  ), 
Figure 47. Percentage of Arcs Discovered versus Total Loss. 
The relationship between the percentage of arcs discovered by the interdictor and the 
total smuggled materiel is very weak. The linear fit accounts for only 10 percent of the 
variance in smuggled materiel. The shaded region indicates the 95 percent confidence 
level. 
(5) The Effect of Miscalculation 
We examine the potential for the interdictor to miscalculate and the relationship 
of these miscalculations to performance. Owing to myriad indirect effects within this 
model, it is difficult to determine definitively if the interdictor has made a poor choice. 
To reduce confounded effects and test for miscalculation specifically, we add an 
experimental artifact to the network. As described in Section A.2, we design an arc, (N13, 
N15), into the Case 1 network that the interdictor must consider, but the smuggler can 
never use (Figure 48). The arc is an arc to nowhere. Even so, the interdictor is never 
made explicitly aware that smuggler transit is impossible on the arc. The interdictor must 
therefore consider the arc in his decision calculus and either address it as a threat or pay 
the arc little attention. If the interdictor expends resources against the arc, the expenditure 
would be a pure miscalculation of the smuggling threat. We find that the interdictor 
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miscalculates and places approximately 11 percent of the available sensors on arc (N15, 
N13) during 540 simulated games (Figure 49).   
Figure 48. Arc to Nowhere. 
Arc (N15, N13) is part of no path available to the smuggler. Any placement of sensors on 
the arc by the interdictor would be a mistake, representing a miscalculation. 
Figure 49. Percent of Sensor Budget Placed Inappropriately. 
The distribution shows the percentages of the interdictor’s available budget that he placed 
inappropriately on arc (N15, N13) during 540 simulated games. The mean percentage is 
11% and the 95% Confidence Interval is [9.8%, 12.6%]. Note the non-symmetric shape 
and left-skewness. 
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Figure 50 shows the relationship between the total smuggled materiel and the 
percent of the interdictor’s sensor budget placed inappropriately on arc (N15, N13). We 
partition the results by total sensor budget. At sensor budgets two and five, there appears 
to be a strong relationship between the amount of materiel smuggled and miscalculation. 
Both the total smuggled materiel and rate of miscalculation increase together. However, 
for sensor budgets three and four, there is a very weak relationship between the total 
materiel smuggled and percent of the interdictor’s sensor budget placed inappropriately. 
Figure 50. Total Smuggled Materiel versus Percent of Sensor Budget 
Misplaced by Sensor Budget. 
Upper Left and Lower Right: The relationship between the total smuggled materiel and 
rate of miscalculation is strongest for sensor budgets two and five, respectively. Lower 
rates of miscalculation correspond with lower total smuggled flow. However, the policy 
that results in the lowest rates changes from pure overt to pure covert (circled in orange). 
The shaded region indicates the 95 percent confidence interval for total smuggled 
materiel (loss).  
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We also find that as sensor budget increases, increasing the allocation to covert 
sensors decreases the miscalculation rate. With a budget of two sensors, a pure overt 
policy shows the lowest misclassification rates and total smuggler flow. However, as the 
sensor budget increases, policies with a higher proportion of covert sensors display 
superior performance in both misclassification rate and amount of smuggler network 
discovered. Thus, in spite of increased exploration, the miscalculation rate still falls 
significantly to very low rates. It is apparent that the interdictor develops a better “sense” 
of the network’s topology with more covert sensors. We emphasize that the converse is 
not true; as shown above in Section (4), better knowledge of the topology does not 
always yield better performance in terms of minimizing the smuggled materiel. 
Figure 51. Percent of Sensor Budget Misplaced versus Percent of 
Sensor Budget Allocated to Covert Sensors. 
At sensor budgets two and three, policies that devote more budget to covert sensors 
miscalculate more often. With sensor budgets of four and five, the trend reverses. More 
covert sensors yields lower rates of miscalculation. 
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Figure 52. Percent of Arcs Discovered versus Percent of Sensor 
Budget Misplaced by Sensor Budget. 
With increasing budget, increased allocation to covert sensors yields both more 
exploration and less miscalculation. Left: Budget with two sensors, hybrid and pure 
covert policies explore more but miscalculate more. Middle Left: Budget with three 
sensors, the trend line flattens, but hybrid and pure covert policies still miscalculate more. 
Middle Right: The trend reverses; pure covert and hybrid policies now explore more and 
miscalculate less. Right: The relationship is strong; covert-heavy policies explore 
significantly more and miscalculate significantly less. 
3. Case 2
In Case 2, we consider a deeper and less wide smuggling network than that 
constructed in Case 1. There are 21 arcs connecting 14 nodes (Figure 53). The designed 
network of Case 2 provides 20 unique s-t paths from the node HB (Hostile Base) to node 
N13. Table 9 displays the initial network data. As in Case 1, the smuggler’s estimates of 
arc capacities and the interdictor’s estimates of arc costs and capacities all begin as 10, 
10, and 1, respectively. We design the remaining network topology and data with the 
same motivation found in Case 1, to create a practical range of total route costs and 
reveal new routes over successive game rounds.  
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Figure 53. The Network for Case 2. 
The network for Case 2 includes 14 nodes and 21 arcs. Arcs with cost above 10 are not 
visible. The interdictor could use four or more sensors to naively make an s-t cut across 
the reverse star of the target (dotted red).  
In Case 2, we shorten the time horizon to 15 game rounds for all scenarios. Arcs 
with cost above 10 are not visible to the smuggler. The timer only introduces two arcs 
through the course of a game. We thus create a significantly different topology that is less 
fluid than that found in Case 1 to test further the extensibility of our observations.  
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Table 9. Case 2 Initial Interdictor and Smuggler Estimates. 
In Case 2, we assume the smuggler’s budget is 500 cost/round, just adequate to 
allow the smuggler to transport any materiel introduced at node HB in a single round 
through the network within the following two to three rounds. Some larger packets now 
require three rounds to traverse the network, owing to the greater network depth in Case 
2. The master scheduling table introduces 186 total units of materiel at node NB. Under
the same portioning scheme found in Case 1, the master scheduling table allots packets to 
each of the 15 rounds of play. 
a. Design of Experiments
Similar to Case 1, we combine an Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (OLH), crossed 
design, and star points to consider 53 equally likely scenarios in Case 2. These scenarios 
also program two decision variables and five noise variables through a realistic range of 
values (Table 10). The 36 points of the augmented crossed design expand our analysis of 
scenarios with sensor budget between one and three. As in Case 1, in Case 2 we are 
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focused on situations where the interdictor cannot make a naïve s-t cut in the reverse star 
of the target (Figure 53). Four or more sensors would allow such a strategy. We use the 
experimental design to investigate the same three general policies found in Case 1: pure 
overt, hybrid, and pure covert. The design replicates each scenario at least 10 times to 
establish the minimum of 90 percent confidence of less than 10 percent error in the 
estimate of the expected value of total smuggled flow. 
Table 10.  Case 2 Range of Factors in Experimental Design. 
Decision 
Variables 
Definition from Chapter 3 Range of values 
covert.budgett maximum number of covert sensors the interdictor can place 
in round t [cardinality/round] 
[0, Sensor Budget] 
overt.budgett maximum number of overt sensors the interdictor can place 
in round t [cardinality/round] 
[0, Sensor Budget] 
Noise Factors Definition from Chapter 3 Range of values 
( , ),i j tq




size of packet p [flow] [1, 2, 3, random 
integer [1,3]] 
packet.signature level of stealth for packets [non-negative integer] [1, 2, 3] 
attenuate rate of cost attenuation    
[{ | (0,1]}attenuate attenuate  ] 
[0.88, 0.95] 
  scaling parameter (0.0 – 1.0) that attenuates the interdictor’s 
capacity estimate from the previous round, 
( , ), 1
ˆ
i j tu 
[0.6, 1.0] 
b. Results
(1) Interdictor Policy Performance: Aggregate Metrics
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Figure 54 shows the total smuggled flow versus the interdictor’s sensor budget. 
As in Case 1, the plot for Case 2 clearly shows a face-valid trend of decreasing total flow 
with increasing sensor budget. 
Figure 54. Total Smuggled Materiel versus Sensor Budget. 
As in Case 1, the total smuggled flow per game in Case 2 decreases as the interdictor’s 
sensor budget increases. 
Figure 55 and Table 11 display the total degradation to smuggled flow and loss by 
policy. Figure 56 shows each individual policy’s performance by sensor budget. 
Table 11.  Policy Performance: Percentage of Degradation of Smuggler Flow. 
With a budget of one or two sensors, pure overt policies maximally degrade the smuggler 
flow. However, hybrid policies become more effective with a budget of three sensors, 
offering 70% degradation of the smuggler flow. 
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Figure 55. Policy Performance by Sensor Budget. 
The projected loss contours show pure overt sensor policies as producing the minimum 
loss with a budget of two (blue line) and three sensors (red dashed). However, the hybrid 
policy is a superior allocation of three total sensors (green broken line). Model details are 
displayed in Appendix A. 
Figure 56. Policy Performance by Sensor Budget. 
(a) With a sensor budget equal to one, the pure overt strategy maximally degrades the 
smuggled flow. It offers 9% more degradation than the pure covert policy. 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Pure Overt
Pure Covert
Percent Degradation of Smuggled Flow 
Sensor Budget 1
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Figure 56. Policy Performance by Sensor Budget (Cont.). 
(b) The pure overt policy still offers the greatest degradation of smuggled flow with two 
sensors available. The degradation is 4% higher than the hybrid (1 covert) policy. 
Figure 56. Policy Performance by Sensor Budget (Cont.). 
(c) With a budget of three sensors, we observe the hybrid (1 covert) policy cause 
maximum degradation of the smuggled flow. 
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As found in Case 1, increasing the probability of detection by an average of 8 
percent yields increased degradation of the smuggled flow (Figure 57).  
Figure 57. Effect of Sensor Sensitivity on the Percent Degradation of 
Smuggled Materiel. 
Similar to Case 1, improving each sensor’s probability of detection by approximately 8% 
yields consistent improvement in all Case 2 scenarios. Left: Using a nonparametric 
permutation test, we can only distinguish between the two Pd scenarios with 80% 
confidence when the number of covert sensors is either one, two, or three. When there are 
three covert sensors, we can distinguish between the two Pd scenarios with over 99% 
confidence. Right: The average flow degradation increases from 5% to 11% as the 
number of covert sensors also increases. However, the largest increase in flow 
degradation, 15%, occurs at the hybrid (1 covert) policy. We produce the curves with 
piecewise splines, 0.05  . 
The degradation generally increases as the interdictor enlists additional covert 
sensors, with a maximum 15 percent degradation of smuggled flow resultant from the 
hybrid (1 covert) policy.   
(2) Interdictor Policy Performance: Time Dynamics 
We continue our method of analysis established in Case 1 by proceeding to explore 
the time dynamics of each policy within Case 2. Using 530 individual time series, we 
construct the 0.9 quantile meta-game for each policy within each sensor budget (Figure 58). 
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In Case 2, we design a game that introduces only 2 arcs introduced by timer. The greater 
network stability manifests slightly more stable game play. While still oscillating, the 
smuggled flow does not change round-to-round by almost an order of magnitude as 
observed in Round 8 of Case 1. Even so, at sensor budget 3, the hybrid policy (2 covert) 
offers the same buffering of peak round-to-round flow we saw in Case 1. 
Figure 58. Meta-Games, the 0.9 Quantile of Smuggled Flow by Game 
Round. 
(a) Sensor Budget 1. Both the peaks and troughs of round-to-round flow are more 
extreme under the pure overt policy.  
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(b) Sensor Budget 2. There is no significant difference between each policies’ round-to-
round performance with only two sensors available. Policies performing well in some 
rounds perform poorly elsewhere. 
(c) Sensor Budget 3. The policies now distinguish themselves. We note the hybrid (2 
covert) policy permits approximately 30–40 percent less round-to-round peak smuggled 
flow than the hybrid (1 covert) policy.  
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(3) Evaluation of Seizures as Proxy for Smuggled Flow 
In Case 2, the value of inference achieved when comparing the total materiel 
detected to the total smuggled is highly inconsistent. Even with a variety of 
transformations of the independent variable, the total materiel seized by the interdictor, 
linear regression models continue to indicate both heteroscedasticity and weak 
explanatory power (Figure 59). Consistent inference is only available once we partition 
the results by individual policy (Figure 60). At sensor budget 1 and 2, the variation in the 
total materiel detected explains between 72 and 91 percent of the variation in total 
smuggled flow. As in Case 1, the strongest relationships occur when the interdictor 
assigns a large proportion of his sensor budget to covert sensors. The amount of detected 
materiel is very weakly related to the total smuggled flow for pure overt and hybrid (2 
covert) (Figure 61). The R2 for the best corresponding linear models is 0.07 and 0.50, 
respectively.  
Figure 59. Linear Regression of Total Smuggled Materiel versus Total 
Materiel Detected. 
A linear model between total smuggled materiel and total materiel destroyed suffers from 
both heteroscedasticity and moderate explanatory power. 
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Figure 60. Total Smuggled Materiel versus Total Materiel Detected. 
Naïve linear models show extremely weak relationships between the total smuggled 
materiel and total materiel detected by the interdictor. 
Figure 61. Model of Total Smuggled Materiel versus Total Materiel 
Detected by Policy at Sensor Budget 2. 
As with Case 1, with a budget of four sensors, the relationship between the total materiel 
detected and the total smuggled materiel is highly inconsistent. It varies from high 
explanatory power for pure covert policy to very low explanatory power for pure overt 
and hybrid (2 covert). The shaded regions represent a 95 percent confidence interval. 
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(4) The Relationship between Discovered Network and Flow 
We again explore the relationship between the interdictor’s success at degrading 
the smuggled flow and the scope of the smuggling network the interdictor discovers. Our 
Case 2 results are consistent with those from Case 1; there is a very weak relationship 
between the total smuggled flow and the percentage of the network the interdictor 
discovers. The relationship between the proportion of covert sensors within the 
interdictor’s policy and the percent of the network he discovers is also non-monotonic 
and does not fully capture the variance in the smuggled flow (Figure 62). Using a non-
parametric scaled Kruskal-Wallis H test, there is strong evidence that as the allocation of 
covert sensors increases, so does the percent of arcs discovered change (p-value ~ 10–6). 
We continue assessing the value of information by now quantifying it with the 
total amount of materiel smuggled. Figure 63 shows the total smuggled materiel versus 
the percentage of all arcs discovered by the interdictor within each of the 47 Case 2 
scenarios. 
Figure 62. Percent Arcs Discovered versus Percent of Sensor Budget 
dedicated to Covert Sensors. 
After one covert sensor is included, policies with more covert sensors offer increasing 
percentages of discovered network. The results of the policies are statistically 
distinguishable (p-value: 10–6). The curve represents a nonparametric kernel density 
smoother model using local weights (blue line). 
101 
As in Case 1, we fit a number of statistical models in an attempt to explain the 
amount of smuggled flow by the percent of arcs discovered. However, the best fit shows 
an extremely weak relationship, accounting for only 16 percent of the variation in total 
smuggled flow (R2 = 0.161). 
Figure 63. Percentage of Arcs Discovered versus Total Loss. 
The relationship between the percentage of arcs discovered by the interdictor and the 
total smuggled materiel is very weak. The best of a variety of model fits only explains 16 
percent of the variance in smuggled materiel. The shaded region indicates the 95 percent 
confidence level. 
Using a linear model, the percentage of arcs discovered only explains 10 percent 
of the variance in the total amount of materiel smuggled. Further investigation by specific 
interdictor policy also revealed weak relationships between these two factors.  
B. OBSERVATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Our two computational cases provide consistent results and expose several 
important unanticipated insights. Based on the data provided by these two cases, we now 
draw important inference and expose several relationships.  
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When the budget for sensors is small, relative to the number of smuggling routes, 
the interdictor should allocate his entire budget to overt sensors. Overt policies tend to 
capture fewer smuggled packets, but raise the smuggler’s perceived risk significantly. 
Observing the placement of multiple overt obstacles, the smuggler shows risk aversion 
and smuggled flow rapidly becomes frustrated within the route structure. The emergent 
risk-averse behavior is analogous to deterrence. Using our model, we are able to assess 
the value of the deterrence, given other policy options.  
As the budget for sensors increases, it becomes more effective for the interdictor 
to employ a hybrid policy involving a mix of overt and covert sensors. In effect, the 
interdictor uses the smuggler’s perception of overt sensors to increase the effectiveness of 
covert sensors. The interdictor can employ hybrid policies in an ambush pattern, herding 
smuggled flow with overt sensors into covert sensors that lay in wait. That is, addressing 
a large front, the risk of the overt sensors substantially increases the attractiveness of the 
route on which the interdictor placed a covert sensor, often making the route the 
smuggler’s new primary choice. Generally, the interdictor has to be less accurate in his 
estimations to employ hybrid policies effectively. 
In contrast to overt policies, pure covert policies primarily achieve their effect by 
actually seizing the smuggled flow. Deterrence is far less important under pure covert 
schemes. For these policies, information is key. Pure covert policies encourage the 
interdictor to target arcs deeper within the smuggling network more precisely. The degree 
of exploration is highest under these policies. Unfortunately, the increased degree of 
exploration does not also increase the interdictor’s effectiveness. With a dynamic 
topology and extremely agile smuggler, the interdictor is often precisely wrong. 
Orienting on a specific set of paths, the interdictor is drawn further into the smuggling 
network, only to be quickly out-flanked by the smuggler’s reaction. The interdictor thus 
fairs poorly in instances of low sensor budgets and pure covert policies, unable to form 
consistently accurate estimates of the smuggler’s intentions. 
Counter to our intuition, our examination of each policy’s time dynamics reveals 
that policies that most-reduce the total smuggler flow are not always the same policies 
that perform best round-to-round. We expect policies generating the highest degradation 
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to total smuggled flow to have also the smallest maximum value of flow in any single 
game round. Our expectation is confirmed in instances of low interdictor sensor budgets. 
However, in both Case 1 and Case 2, instances of higher sensor budgets reveal that 
hybrid policies with more covert sensors reduce the peak round-to-round flow 
considerably.  
Hybrid policies appear to prevent surprise to a substantially greater degree. Case 
1, round 8 provides the tactical analogy of smuggler deception and well illustrates the 
improved round-to-round performance of hybrid policies described above. As a new 
route is withheld until round 8, the interdictor is seduced to varying degree by the 
smuggler’s—albeit unconscious—deceptive actions in rounds 1 to 7. The interdictor 
policies that are least deceived in rounds 1 to 7 are not always those that most reduce the 
total smuggled flow. However, in almost all cases we explored they are a close second.   
It appears that while adaptability is important in the interdictor-smuggler 
problem, under situations that consider two-sided uncertainty, being too agile and too 
aggressive in exploration can significantly reduce effectiveness. Under several pure 
covert policies, the interdictor’s feedback loops appeared overly sensitive, causing 
frequent and inappropriate changes to sensor locations round-to-round. Smuggler flow 
was distinctly higher when this happened. It appears that the adventurous, under-
informed, and hyper-agile interdictor fluctuates wildly. Hybrid policies appear to calm 
the fluctuation, and appear to leverage the smuggler’s own risk calculus against him. 
Presented with the opportunity to increase or develop his resources, the 
interdictor must prioritize his goals. With minimal budgets, the interdictor should focus 
on maximizing deterrence. Gaining an additional sensor is more helpful in these cases 
than increasing sensor sensitivity. With greater budgets, establishing a hybrid policy 
should be the interdictor’s priority. Once established, increasing covert sensor sensitivity 
provides significant rewards in reduced total smuggled flow, higher seizure rates, and 
greater resilience to surprise. We have not modelled the effect of intelligence gained by 
exploiting seized materiel. The knowledge from these exploits can prove tactically 
decisive. More heavily covert hybrid policies offer substantial increases in materiel 
capture rates and should be selected if materiel exploitation is a priority. 
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We expect that as the interdictor discovers more of the smuggler’s network, the 
interdictor would be able to better influence the smuggler flow, but this is not the case. 
The observation reinforces our earlier warning on the dangers of interdictor adventurism 
under limited information. Even so, if discovery of the physical structure of the network 
is important, policies with heavy covert sensor allocations are best suited to the task. 
Our limited excursion to study the effect of miscalculation demonstrates that the 
policies that best reduce total smuggled flow and are more resilient to surprise also 
result in the least miscalculation by the interdictor. This finding corroborates the policy 
performance assessments thus far. As before, the reduced miscalculation is generally not 
related only to the type of policy, but instead related to the type of policy in light of the 
sensor budget. 
Lastly, we show that the amount of seized materiel is a poor proxy for the total 
amount of smuggled flow. The relationship between these factors is very inconsistent. In 
policies where deterrence is high, the amount of seized materiel provides almost no 
information on the actual amount of unseen materiel successfully smuggled. Now 
presented with the results, the finding agrees with our intuition. A policy that relies on 
deterrence, an intangible emergent effect, should not use seizures as a performance 
measure. In contrast, the amount of materiel seized can be used to very accurately 
estimate the total smuggled flow for heavily covert policies. We believe it is impractical 
to distinguish these situations in real world interdictor-smuggler contests. Estimates that 
naïvely measure overall interdiction performance by seizure rate should be carefully 
examined.    
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V. CONCLUSION 
The main points of this thesis are twofold: 
(1) A range of realistic, complex behaviors can emerge from the interaction of 
two hostile, intelligent agents acting under simple rules within a dynamic environment of 
uncertainty and danger.  
(2) We can gain insight into these complex situations through heuristics that 
combine complimentary optimization, stochastic, and game-theoretic models under an 
umbrella of simulation. 
Previous research into martial contests, such as this interdictor-smuggler context, 
has made various strong assumptions in the name of tractability. These persistent 
assumptions include perfect information, an unchanging environment, and non-
adaptability. Our constructive cases from Chapter 3 and full model results in Chapter 4, 
demonstrate massive perturbations in both the conduct of play and game results as we 
deliberately and cumulatively relax these assumptions. Each of these relaxations admits 
an essential feature of the problem—features unambiguously identified by the breadth of 
military doctrine as the essence of conflict. The significant effect of these essential 
features, demonstrated in this thesis, should draw sharp focus on the results of many 
models that attempt to study combat otherwise. Specifically, is it sensible to study 
situations in a martial context and ignore uncertainty or adaptation? Assigning 
omnipotence to one or both combatants in this type of context for tractability is deeply 
dissatisfying. It conflicts at a philosophical level with both historical and contemporary 
military thought. Solving problems under a philosophically different paradigm than that 
in martial practice endangers the real utility and accuracy of any insights gained. Solving 
problems by artificially striping away essential complexity so that it fits more cleanly into 
only optimization, game theory, or stochastics is equally limiting.  
We have shown that constructing an interdisciplinary model can unite the 
strengths of these fields in a complimentary fashion. It can generate feasible face-valid 
solutions to our problem at very limited computational expense. By also considering time 
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dynamics, many new insights present themselves, such as the emergence of deterrence, 
giving light to new types of research questions.  
Our study is meant to be a prototype, demonstrating the power of a hybrid model. 
It is not without its limitations. We have made assumptions on the method and speed by 
which hostile agents might evolve in a martial context. While these provide a direct 
analogue to contemporary military methods, there are other ways. We did not include the 
advantage obtained by interrogation and exploitation after the capture of enemy forces 
and materiel. In many military campaigns, intelligence gained through such exploitation 
has been decisive. The duration of our cases considered was necessarily finite. Even so, 
the basis of our time horizon is subject to debate; so is the design and programmed 
evolution of our network topologies. 
The degree of validation for this type of research may be significantly bounded by 
the limits of knowability inherent to these problems. These limits have to do with the 
observability and measurability of important performance data within the high 
uncertainty and mortal danger of real-world combat. In many ways, refinements of 
computational simulation using a blend of optimization, stochastics, and game theory 
may be the best way to continue investigation. Even so, future research could admit real 
world data to craft a wider array of smuggling networks or specific instances of interest. 
Under a broader set of configurations, models similar to ours could prove a great aid to 
training both inter-agency decision makers and their staffs. That training could encourage 
unique perspectives and seed important questions that might expose highly non-intuitive 
and indirect ways of influencing the outcome and assessing performance during real 
interdiction or counter-trafficking missions. 
Further investigation should also more deeply consider the coupling of an 
interactive environment and intelligent agents. By allowing this interaction, we admit a 
difficult yet realistic miasma of uncertainty, risk, estimation, prediction, miscalculation, 
success, failure, deception, and deterrence. Within such a challenging scene, unreconciled 
differences between orientation and reality can bring catastrophe, despite adequate 
resources. Policies that encourage deliberate and beneficial adjustments of orientation 
while allowing timely action in spite of uncertainty beg greater study. The value of 
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relative information superiority is likely involved. Indeed, on a deeper level, there may be 
far stronger links between perception, performance, adaptation, innovation, and the rules 
by which we both consciously and unconsciously choose to operate. 
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APPENDIX. STATISTICAL MODELS 
Case 1: General Additive Regression Model 
Dependent Variable: Total Smuggled Materiel (Loss) 
Term Coefficient Std Error Prob>|t| 
Intercept 2229.8197 70.56683 <0.0001 
Covert  -152.1365 13.06025 <0.0001 
Overt  -206.9444 13.52863 <0.0001 
Q  -0.654293 1.119532 0.5614 
Size{2&3&1-4}  -113.0372 23.80764 <0.0001 
Size{2-3&1} 18.667449 29.5781 0.5306 
Size{3-1}  -0.589296 37.26125 0.9874 
Signature  -125.62 12.49998 <0.0001 
(Covert-1.98611)*(Overt-1.98611)  -22.24899 8.598785 0.0124 
(Covert-1.98611)*Size{2&3&1-4} 105.55112 17.07788 <0.0001 
(Covert-1.98611)*(Signature-2.09722)  -20.83159 8.214892 0.0141 
(Overt-1.98611)*Size{2&3&1-4} 30.366644 14.54132 0.0415 
(Overt-1.98611)*Size{3-1}  -123.7667 27.57538 <0.0001 
(Q-30.0556)*Size{2-3&1}  -21.87887 3.4043 <0.0001 
(Q-30.0556)*Size{3-1}  -7.854226 3.561776 0.0317 
Size{2-3&1}*(Signature-2.09722) 419.73442 71.7034 <0.0001 
(Covert-1.98611)*(Covert-1.98611)  -36.33692 8.211495 <0.0001 
(Overt-1.98611)*(Overt-1.98611) 36.884488 5.599369 <0.0001 
R2 0.96 
Adjusted R2 0.95 
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Case 2: General Additive Regression Model 
Dependent Variable: Total Smuggled Materiel (Loss) 
Term Estimate Std Error Prob>|t| 
Intercept 1315.2894 39.21573 <0.0001 
Covert  -125.6307 11.74715 <0.0001 
Overt  -252.6989 12.73089 <0.0001 
Signature  -62.22282 14.45549 <0.0001 
(Overt-1.43396)*(Overt-1.43396) 60.392199 9.516845 <0.0001 
R2 0.90 
Adjusted R2 0.90 
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